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Soviet China - Ninghsia

Interview with Peng Teh-huai
On Red partisan warfare and the history of P'engs army
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Interview with C Peng Teh-huai

The political situation in C is one link in the whole world situation. Likewise rev. has reached a new stage & there are new characteristics.

First, no longer isolated because the conflict throughout the world between capitalist & socialist society, occurring simultaneously, becomes more and more acute.

Second, in colonial & semi-colonial countries the resistance & struggle vs imperialist exploitation has increased. In Abyssinia, India, China, Korea, Egypt, Palastine, the struggle is reaching new depth & intensity.

At same time the conflict within cap. structure sharpens also. The golden age of capitalism is already passed. America is a good example. In the capitalist countries the class struggle has intensified. In France, Germany, Spain & other European countries this struggle is conducted on a wide front. Capitalism in those countries has nearly exhausted its possibilities.

Third, the struggle and rivalry for colonies among Imperialist countries is increasing. For example, Italy's annexation of Abyssinia aroused the resentment of other imperialists. In Manchuria & China Japanese imperialism conflicts deeply with the interests of British & U.S. imperialism. This rivalry & jealousy among the imperialists weakens the whole imperialist system throughout the world.

At present C is gradually losing its independence & becoming colonized. During this time the ruling class is being divided. Even among Chiang Kai-shek's clique there are splits, factions, cliques, and every militarist has his own background. The officials of the Nanking govt. dislike their position & feel that there is no future for them. This is the beginning of the collapse of the whole ruling class. All the officials of the KMT and in the pay of Chiang Kai-shek are in conflict and the division among them indicates a greater & deeper decay of the ruling class & it becomes apparent that they are even themselves dissatisfied with their own rule.

Another fact which establishes the non-isolation of the C revolution is the growing success of the Soviet Union. The liquidation of classes, and there is no economic crisis, no bankruptcy, no social maladjustment. The minorities in the S U have won genuine independence & emancipation. The proletariat of the world has been taught by this that the S U can be the model and that they must carry on their own struggle following this model. Only in this way can they win freedom and assure peace.

Especially in C the example of the S U has a tremendously stimulating effect on the majority of C people. Because of the contrast between Soviet policies in China with those of the imperialists the Chinese people realize that the S U is the only country opposed to exploitation & determined to protect the interests of the weak & small countries & minorities. The O.M. - S U pact had a very stimulating effect, showing the masses that the S U is the genuine friend of the minorities of China. Chiang Kai-shek & the traitors made a protest over this pact; in reply the S U frankly pointed out the failure of the KMT to offer any resistance in Manchuria, in North China, & against Japanese smuggling, declaring that the S U had no ambition to annex O.M., that it clearly recognized it as part of China. The Chinese masses thus more clearly understood the real role of Chiang & the KMT & at the same time their understanding of Soviet policies increased & their feeling of friendship deepened.

Since the failure of the Rev 10 years have passed. What has Chiang Kai-shek accomplished for the people, the masses & the capitalists? To the people Chiang has given heavy taxes and a slave future. To the capitalists KMT & Chiang Kai-shek control has brought crisis & bankruptcy. To the peasantry C K-s has brought ruin of agrarian economy. The changes in these ten years may remind the KMT of the time they coop with the C P of the time the strike in Hongkong made the British imp port a dead port; of the activities in Wuhan & Nanking when the mass movement had reached its highest point & the foreign concessions were returned to China. The position of C at that time was high. National capitalists were entering a prosperous period & the living conditions of the masses were better than now. Democratic liberties existed. Ten years control by C K-s, as already mentioned, have brought economic bankruptcy to rural society. During long march we passed Kwangsi, Kweichow, Yunnan, Szechuan & other provinces & we witnessed at first hand the living condition of the peasantry. During winter, when snow was still heavy, people had no clothes to wear. Women who were already ill had still no trousers. Peasants could not manage to get even one meal per day. These conditions prevailed in all provinces we passed so that majority of peasants were driven down the road of death. "There's no way to heaven, no door to hell." This is the "construction" of the KMT, this is virtue of the KMT. Without a big population floating from here to there, without homes, without the whole nation driven down from semi-colonial to colonial status, territories are given up one after another. In the reign of C K-s and KMT continues the danger of enslavement of C people increases. It does not come by itself. It is due to C K-s and KMT's proposed selling out. For this purpose Chiang K-s & the KMT have many theories. We must construct first, then resist. Chinese are like sand. Most C are illiterate, not prepared to fight the Japanese. In reality all these excuses are proved to be shameless lies. The masses realized this in their experience. As for "first construct, then resist," consider Manchuria, with its high industrial development, its great percentage of railways.

Consider Peiping & Tientsin, also highly developed. These already constructed places have been lost to Japan.

Chiang K-s defames the C people, saying they are like sands. But the patriotic students, patriotic people, organized themselves for purpose of saving country. The KMT govt not only has no intention of organizing people, but replies to people who wish to do so with slaughtering, jail & suppression. It is apparent it isn't the people who have no organizing ability and are not united; it is the KMT & Nanking govt which destroys & suppresses these organizations. Chiang K-s & the traitors defame the C people, saying that they are mostly illiterate, but up to the present the traitors who sell out the nation are mostly educated & returned students from Japan. Chiang K-s is a returned, Jap student, so in Yen Ju-keng. Shameless lies of this kind become more & more ineffective & the Chinese ruling class purposely spreads these lies as a smoke screen for the imperialist countries while they sell out the C people as slaves of the imp. countries. But the C masses know that if we don't resist when imp. invade China there's no method that makes construction possible, to raise cultural level, to raise peasant economy, etc. If C wants to accomplish these things the only way is to organize a Nat Defence Gov as the C C P has advocated. This expresses the demand of the majority of the C people, namely, the united front against Jap imp. Even Chiang's generals express their ideas about that. In 1932, when Gen. Chen Cheng was surrounding Kiangsi at the same time the Japanese occupied Manchuria then Chen Cheng said, "The Chinese enemy is not the R A but the Jap. We must unite with them to fight Japan." Many other generals made the same demand. Chiang's reply was "If anyone else wants to make war with Japan and cease war on R A the reply will be death to him."

So Gen Hu Tsung-nan expressed his idea about fighting the Reds very badly. He said "to fight the Reds is a life sentence." Others said, to oppose the Reds is to clear the road for the Japanese. When the 19th Route Army fought the Shanghai war, Chiang sent his own troops to disarm them, but Chiang's men fought with R A in spite of that. The Chinese troops were but 20,000. The J outnumbered them 5 times & their weapons were superior in every respect. Still the C troops fought courageously for over one month & had it not been for Chiang K-s's treachery the Shanghai war would not have ended as it did. When the 19th R A established a people's govt in Fukien Chiang K-s sent more than ten divisions to destroy it. More recently, when KMT and Kwangsi called upon the whole nation to resist J, Chiang K-s utilized treacherous methods to divide Canton - by money, bribes, etc. The C R A since Sept 18 incident, has declared to the whole country that it is willing to cooperate with any armed forces to resist J. It sent one part of its troops to the north to resist J; the 7th Army was sent out specially in 1934 to begin a campaign vs J. It was resisted by Chiang K-s. At present it is still struggling on the border of Cheking & Fukien. The main Red forces, to resist J, marched from Kiangsi to Shansi, passing the poorest places. In February the R A crossed the Yellow River & entered Shansi, declaring that it would cross Shansi to Hopei, to fight J. Chiang K-s.

promptly sent his troops to repel the Reds, construct fortifications & force other troops to attack the R A base in Shensi.

There is only one way to resist J. That is what the RA & S G has proposed: a national defense govt cessation of civil war, an allied army & unified program of resistance to J. The R A will be the first of all to send troops to Hopei to resist the J. The C masses have become clearer about the long history of the KMT & the C people have come to realize that the Nat Defense Gov is the only method of resisting J.

In May the First R A retreated to Shensi because Chiang K-s & Yen Shi-shen, under the direction of J imperialism obstructed us in many ways. To struggle & prepare for future action against J & to expose Chiang KOs role; to fight a civil war in Shansi would have further diminished C's fighting strength. After our retreat we proposed to Nanking to cease war for one month. At the same time delegates were sent, advocating the alliance of all forces for war vs J. No reply was received & our delegates were arrested in Shansi. Delegate to Nanking unheard of since. Chiang gave his reply by continued attack; several divisions belong to Wang En-pou entered Shensi to fight the Soviets. Chiang's deceit ought to be more fully realized under these circumstances. Formerly Chiang said that KMT was really anti Jap but could not resist because of Reds in the rear. In fact when J occupied Manchuria, Hopei & East Szechuan there was no protest from Nanking, not to mention resistance. To say now that the Reds are disturbing Chiang's rear is ridiculous for they have no contact. On the contrary it was KMT troops who blocked Reds in K from fighting Japan. It was only by the greatest effort that the Reds in spite of Chiang's blockage, the R A marched to the north. While R A was moving north to fight J, Chiang K-s was withdrawing from North China & possible contact with J. This fact should be clearly realized & it is more effective than all Chiang's propaganda in the past. After the Red withdrawal from Shansi to Kwangsi & made its proposal for peace, Chiang Kai-s bribed the Moslems to attack Red areas & destroy Pao-an. At the same time he prevented the 4th Army from marching northward to resist J. For purposes of concentration, to join forces with the 4th corps, the 1st R A corps moved from North Shensi to the west, to prepare for renewed efforts to resist Japan.

Q - You think it isn't possible then that the Nanking govt under Chiang K-s will in the future resist J?

A - We really hope that Nanking will cooperate with us & resistance will begin, but we fear that this cannot be realized & will remain a hope. Nanking has accepted the Three Principles of Hota & two of these principles make resistance out of question. First, all anti-J activity must be suppressed; second, J Imp & Nanking must form a U F against Communism. Under continued pressure, however, the danger of enslavement by J may bring about a division at Nanking & swing one part of the KMT to the anti J Front.

Q -- Now that the 4th Army under Chu Teh has arrived in Kansu, what is the probable effect on the Northwest military & political situation?

A -- Chiang Kai-sung will of course attempt to prevent the concentration of the Red forces in ShanKai. Nanking & will send troops to oppose us, because this concentration has its purpose to fight J. Chiang must obey the Huota Principles; therefore he must oppose the Red concentration. In this attempt he will fail. The possibilities of Red concentration are bright because (1) Nine years of struggle have given the R A experience & fighting ability surpassing all the rest of the forces of China; (2) because the R A concentration has a political mission, to resist J, and this mission raises higher the determination of Red fighters to destroy Chiang's opposition; (3) because Red slogans & policies are very clear, and are being realized, which appeal to & win sympathy of the majority of white soldiers; (4) because the 4th army has passed through the most difficult passes and rivers, and have already reached a richer district, easier to maneuver in.

Just as the Chinese ruling class is no longer satisfied with the rule of Nanking, so in the Northwest there is also wavering & demoralization. Secondly, in the other districts in central & south China partisan warfare & soviet districts have developed more and more. Third, troops invading the Red districts are against this war & are wavering. Northeastern troops, for example, are from Manchuria; their homes have already been occupied by the J. They feel that to attack the Reds offers them no future. In Manchuria they were ordered to retreat without fighting, and retreated to Hopei, then to Shensi & war on the Reds. In this war they received several severe defeats & the officers realized that to continue the war would bring about the liquidation of the entire army. Under these circumstances the army has lost its will to fight vs us. The Tungpei troops are already homeless; at same time the war with the R A is unseccessful. The Tungpei troops are now shouting their own anti-Jap slogan, "To fight back to our old home." The policy of the R A is welcomed by the Tung pei soldiers who realize that only by cooperation with R A can they have any future. Therefore there is a real opportunity for union of R A & the Tungpei men.

Minorities of the Northwest have long been deceived, slaughtered & oppressed by the C. In 1927 Feng Yu-hsung carried out a great massacre of Mohammedans. From the past religion was used to deceive the people. Economically the minorities neared a state of bankruptcy. Suicides in the Yellow River are frequent among Moslem peasants unable to pay taxes and levies. J agents are now in Numghsia & under them Li Shou-hsin's troops occupied Chahar ' part of Szechuan. The whole N W is threated by Jap & the people realize. Mohammedan people in Sechuang realize that the S U helped Moslem Turks & freed them from fear of war. Now they see the difference between S U policies & KMT's. Also example of Outer Mongolia. J wants to invade O M but dares not because of S.U. but she occupies Hopei & Cahar without firing a shot. Mohammedans know about the life of freedom of M'dans in Turkestan & want to coop with Soviet movement in C.

There is great possibility of coop in NW between R A & M'dans. Latter can organize ~~members~~ themselves in autonomous defense govt & arm themselves to oppose J. This already begun. There is now one M'dan Independent Divison & many Moslems in R A Mongolians also feel friendly toward R A Mongolians also feel friendly toward R A & understand the Red policy toward the minorities. Even the Mongol partisans which belong to the Mongolian People's Anti-J Army are glad to wear Red caps when they can get them. Partisans are mostly in Anpian region & to the north. Otaka & 2 other Mongol leagues.

Ma Hung-kwi is not popular among the M'dans & many are opposed to him. Their turning to join the Reds will be a very important factor in the N W. The Moslem Reds now in the R A are mostly former troops of Ma Hung-kwei & Ma Hung-ping, captured in warfare. There are C P members among the Moslems & a Keeking Tung (Moslem Nationalist Rev. Party) in Moslem areas. They both carry on anti-Jap activities secretly; Ma Hung¹/₂kuei recently arrested six in Ninghsia.

Hu-cheng In the NW armies Chiang k-s has fascist cells, such as in Yang ~~Ho-chin~~, Wang Chun, Chu Hsiac-liang, and Chang Hsueh-liang's armies. These are, however, losing their influence, especially as only role for NW armies assigned by Chiang Kai-s is to fight the Reds. Inner conflicts between their armies are increasing; none of them wants to be destroyed by the Reds.

Since Jap invasion of N C the menace to the N W has increased. The popular feeling against J is growing and disgust with Nanking's non-resistance is increasing. People see that the Outer Mongols, who broke away from Nanking's control, are now secure; at the same time Huapei has gone under J influence without resistance. The Moslems have been impressed by the justice, fighting spirit and discipline of the R A & the feelings between the Reds & Moslems are warmer. The past Han wars against the Moslems have cost 200,000 lives here.

Because of these four basic reasons the Red movement in the NW has widened. The victorious future of the Red Army and the possibility of organizing a national defense anti-J alliance govt offer a bright prospect for winning support throughout the whole of C.

We are certain that Chiang will send reinforcements to the NW to fight the Red Army & will use every militarist force to oppose us and cooperate with J. Under present circumstances however with the revolutionary situation as it is, we do not fear the combined efforts of Chiang & the Japanese. No army in C today can destroy the R A.

Just as the C revolution is not isolated from the rest of the world, so the NW revolutionary situation cannot be isolated from the rest of C. What happens here is certain to influence & be influenced by, events in the rest of the country, very likely in a decisive way.

Q -- If a United Front is achieved between the R A Tungpei, M'dan & Sung Cheh-yuan troops, is it possible and advisable to begin resistance to J at once, or must a united front be achieved throughout the whole country first?

A -- It is quite possible to form a United Front not only with the troops you mention but with certain military leaders & the mass of the soldiers in Shansi province. For example, Gen. Li Sheng-ta was assassinated by Fascists who killed him because he favored acceptance of the Red Army's proposal for a one month armistice & anti-J conference. As J pressure increases there will be more cases like this. In Li's army (19th of Shansi) the two-day magazine published many patriotic & anti-J activities. His wife & child were burned at same time.

J imperialism will use its own forces to attack the U F in the NW & it is quite clear that only by their resistance can it defend itself. In practice it is probably impossible to achieve a national united front before resistance begins. The Red Army is the vanguard of the anti-J movement & its actions will tend to lead out the patriotic elements in White armies everywhere in C, at the same time assisting & encouraging the anti-J elements in Manchuria.

Since 1932 the C R A and S govt have been in a state of war with J and when the two armies come into contact war will automatically occur. It is possible, however, that J might hesitate to attack a U F once achieved. In that case the U F would carry out its policy of recovery of lost territory & permit J peacefully to retire.

Q -- Can C in her present state of development & with her present resources, fight a successful war vs J imperialism alone - without a foreign ally?

A -- The industrial & economic development of C is backward, it is true. But in order to have any future development C must remain an independent country. C welcomes the cooperation of all countries in this development regardless of whether they are socialist, capitalist or imperialist, so long as they do not violate the basic principle of the sovereignty of the C people. Even if such cooperation is lacking, however, the conditions for a victorious struggle of the C people vs J are still present.

Q -- What is the probable course of development of such a war? What is the main strategy & tactics which the R A would advocate to win victory?

A -- Considering backwardness of C industries & the state of C armies, the basic aim of C strategy in such a war must be not simply to defeat but to annihilate the fighting strength of the J army. The warfare will be featured by swift contacts & withdrawals and avoidance of major engagements in positional warfare. At same time war will utilize the mass movement in resisting J. Once J enters the country she will be like a blind man. Even though equipped with latest weapons these cannot be used effectively in a country where the populace is organized to oppose it. J will be in somewhat the same position as Chiang K-s was in Kiangsi; with a 1,000,000 troops he was still very much handicapped as soon as he entered the Soviet districts because the people were non-cooperative. The war would not be brief but must be conducted over a long period, a war to the death. The Chinese people can endure very long warfare & its resources are sufficient to maintain the people & the army. J may blockade a few ports, but she cannot hold them permanently vs foreign protests.

In the north there is the Soviet Union, which will surely help China, being a friend of oppressed people, and the enemy of imperialist aggression. As we have secured our ammunition & supplies in civil war from the white armies, in the war with Japan we'll secure them from the imperialist forces.

Q -- How many troops is it possible, with available resources, for China to organize, equip and maintain for the duration of a war against Japan?

A -- Once revolutionary demands of the people are granted, once unjust taxes & levies are lifted, the necessary Chinese army can easily be raised and maintained. To be successful, resistance must be accompanied by national land revolution. Even without the land distribution, even if only the property of traitors J imperialism, etc is confiscated, a great mass movement & mass support can be developed for the war basis. That this is possible was demonstrated in 1925 to 1927, during the period of the Great Revolution.

In order that the mass of the people will join in the anti-Imperialist war some of their main problems must be solved. By sacrificing the interests of the great landlords, who are only about 1% of the population, the enthusiasm & support of the rest of the people can be stimulated. The power of such an appeal is demonstrated by the R A. It has proved invincible because it solved some of the problems of the masses. The KMT's anti-Jap movement however collapsed in failure because it failed to offer a single benefit to the masses, failed to accomplish a single revolutionary act, from the standpoint of livelihood of the masses. An idea of the potential fighting ability of the Chinese people, when once organized & armed, is likewise furnished by Soviet history in Kiansi. There, out of a population of 3,000,000 in an industrially backward area, the R A maintained itself as a unit of 100,000 fighters against every superiority in technique on the side of the enemy.

The technical superiorities of Japan can likewise be overcome by a united revolutionary people.

The war in Manchuria has been going on between Japan & partisans for 5 years & Japan is still not victorious. The war in Shanghai, although tactically wrong, still put up resistance successfully for over one month against great odds.

Q -- How does C. Peng maintain contact with the rank & file of the army? Has the ordinary soldier the right to see him & consult with him?

A -- The relations between higher officers & men are comradely & on a basis of equality. Any soldier can come to the C-in-c if he wishes to do so, but actually most problems of soldiers are solved in smaller groups, organizations & units of R A. If the question goes beyond that it is probably a political matter & is decided by the political commissar. But any soldier can see his commander on any important problem, if he so desires.

Q -- What punishment is provided for insubordination in the R A ?

A -- Discipline in the R A is quite different from the White Army, where discipline is maintained by beating, imprisonment or death. In the R A discipline is maintained by political education. Any offense against discipline is punished, but by instruction to correct his error. Refusal to obey an order is punished ~~but~~ by ~~instruction~~ a lecture by the political commissar. In serious cases the offender is put in the Study Room & forced to read or listen to lectures correcting his mistake. No bodily injury is done him. Iron discipline is maintained but it is only possible on a voluntary cooperative class basis. In R A rank & file like officers, unlike the White Army where White officers oppress their men. Here the officers come from the ranks, from the best of their class, they know the feeling & conditions of their men, & they are one of them in spirit and conduct.

Q -- How else do you explain the high morale, fighting ability & invincibility of the Red Army, against very great odds, over the past ten years?

A -- Red soldiers are fighting for their own interests, for their class, for society; they are conscious fighters for a cause they understand. Secondly, Red tactics are superior to any of the enemy, they are unknown to the enemy, and they are developed out of the experience & skill of the Red armies in actual battle. Third, because the R A had its base in the masses. Chiang V shek said that when the KMT armies entered Soviet areas they became like a blind man. White troops can get no information about R A & its movements, no food, no workers; area becomes deserted. This is true in the N W as well as Kiangsi, but the fighting experience & whole cultural level of the masses here is inferior to that in the south.

Yu Wang Pao, Aug. 21-25

On Red Army & Guerrilla Warfare & History of Peng's army

In 1927, after uprising in Nanchang, Yeh Tung & Ho Lung did not raise Red Flag but there began the disaffection of KMT army. They led their armies to Tunghoang of Kuantung & were defeated. (About 20,000 had taken part in the Nanchang uprising). They failed chiefly because of the wavering petty-bourgeoisie character of movement & bad tactics. Yeh T'ing fled to Germany. Ho Lung went from Canton to Shanghai. From Shanghai he disguised himself & entered the west of Kiangsi. Only about 4-500 men remained under leadership of Chu Teh & went to south of Hunan, where joined with Fan Shih-sung. In July & August of the same year there was an uprising called Autumn Uprising, led by Mao Tse-tung. Most of the participants were peasants, numbering 100s of thousands in the east of Hunan, but they were mostly unarmed. This peasant mob attacked Changsha & was defeated by White troops. Mao led the remnant to the south of Hunan & joined Chu Teh. Together they had about 7-800 rifles & captured Chingkanshan in the winter of 1927. The Red Flag with Hammer and sickle, had already been raised in the East of Hunan, by Mao Tse-tung. When Chu and Mao combined the army was called the Workers & Peasants army. In same year, Dec. 11, the Canton uprising. Troops belong to the uprising belong to Red Army & after it Chu & Mao adopted new name. ✓

Chingkanshan

Chingkanshan is in the center of the Lu Shiao mountains which spread from Canton north to the Yantse River; at the border of Hunan, Kiangsi & Kwantung. Banditry there has never been liquidated. From the plain to the mountain plateau is 40 li & the surrounding peak has an area of 300 li. Diameter 70 to 80 li. The plateau and sides holds a population of 2 - 3,000. The ~~main~~ production is mostly Chinese drugs - sweet grass, paper, etc - timber & grain. The crops of one year are sufficient for 4 - 5 years use. Population mostly opium smokers! Five routes lead to the mt, two from Kiangsi side, three from Hunan side. Two on H. side are Wangyangchieh, Pa Mien Tsan, and Chinchoushan. From Kiangsi are Hsiao Hung Chou and Paonihu.

White troops at first paid no attention to Chu & Mao. They could rest for 2 or 3 months & Mao's Hongkong feet could cure. There was a bandit leader, Wang Tao, on the mt. when the Reds arrived & he offered no resistance; later rebelled. Chu-Mao proceeded to establish the Soviets in four hsien in Kiangsi, three in Hunan. Partisan & guerrilla warfare began. The highest authority in these hsien was the provincial soviet of Shan-Kan-Pien Cheng-fu (Hunan-Kiangsi border Soviet Govt)

In early 1928 the main Red forces increased from 1,300 to 1,500 on the mt top. The south Hunan uprising occurred in coop with the C P in spring of 1928. Then the R A increased to 3,000. In the same year, 1928, occurred the Peng Teh-huan uprising, July led by CP members & participated in by 3,000 soldiers. This occurred while enemy was surrounding Chingkanshan for the 3rd time. The Pingkang uprising was best that had occurred because arrested all reactionary officers, all officials, gentry, white officers of the nonuprising troops, and disarmed all who did not participate. In the meeting two slogans were adopted: "We are sons of workers and peasants, we struggle for their interests." Every soldier in the uprising wore a red ribbon around his neck. Occurred on July 22. The third day they established the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border provincial Soviet govt. Seven days later the White troops attacked Ping Kiang with 20 regiments & the fight continued a whole day; dead & wounded were serious casualties; that night they retreated to Kiangsi, capturing two Kiangsi cities in their march. After the retreat to Kiangsi the enemy's forces were strong & in pursuit of them. (There was a railway between Pinghsiang, Anyuan & Yuanchow; secretly held by enemy, could not be penetrated to Chingkanshan). Ping Kiang vicinity offered no mt. stronghold like Chingkanshan; therefore we chose guerrilla warfare on the flat plain. Our main field of operation was in the 7 or 8 hsien along the provinsional border. Soldiers had left production for many years, and their class consciousness was not strong. Under severe warfare & white propaganda many rebelled, many fled away. In Sept 1928 only 2,000 of the original 3,000 rebellious soldiers remained. At that time the attack from the enemy was very severe. For over 300 li all houses were burned by the White troops, all food was removed, and the whole area was made into no man's land. This was White troops method of destroying Reds. The peasants were very good; dug from ground food which they had saved

and themselves ate wild grass & vegetables. Loved the Red soldiers and supported them. The Reds had no materials for clothes & used bark to make short tunics, all the clothes they had. No shoes, no quarters, no light, no rebeatable oil, no salt. Cut bottoms of trousers to make shoes. Hair grew long. Peasants were also starving; lived on potatoes. Even under these conditions the Reds can fight & win battles. This due mainly to attitude of the peasants, who had called the Reds their own troops, encouraged them in battle & helped them fight the White troops. Why? Because there had already been no-rent struggles before the Reds came, and afte they arrived they seized property of the rich, divided it, and organized themselves. The Great Revolution had also penetrated here. When the R A came to a place the peasants went on guard for them; when Whites approached the peasants voluntarily sent runners & messengers to the Reds to warn them. Withmmh such mass support it was possible for the R A to struggle under very bad conditions.

Among the White troops, during **Ta Ke Ming**, there were soldiers committees, which protected interests of the soldiers. These were destroyed after the counter-revolution. Returned to the old life. This fact was used in Peng Teh-huan's uprising as well as other charges such as return to exploitation of the soldiers property. When land & property of landlords was confiscated the soldiers were lectured on significance & why: that all they possessed had come from the workers & peasants. Described future of Red Army; pointed to Russian Revolution; showed them that their struggle was not hopeless, but certain to be ultimately victorious. During Ta Ke Ming there was a decreased of 25% in rent; later abolished by KMT counter-revolution & old taxes replaced. Also soldiers were taught elementary facts of foreign imperialism. Soldiers' committees were established. (At time of uprising Peng was in 35th Army, 1st Division, 1st Regiment, Regimental Commander. 35th Army was Ho Chien's. His regiment was biggest in the division, had w,000 men, 14 companies. Besides this regiment there was a regimental school & this joined the uprising. Huang Kung-lieh was master of the school. Besides that the special guards of the division & the 2nd and 3rd regiments also joined)

Dec 7, 1928, Chu Mao Peng met in ~~Chuganshan~~, **Ching Kangshan** Chu 1st Army, Mao Political Commisar, Peng the 5th Army. Before that, when Peng was in P'ing Kiang hsien he took one part of his troops to Ching Kangshan, thinking conditions couldn't be worse. Huang Tung-lieh remained in P'ing=Kiang. When they reached Chinkanshan they found material conditions even worse than in Ping Kiang. Chu Teh's army had few dothes, no cloth, were shivering with cold. Soldiers got only 3 cents per day for food; ate mainly squash. Even so the R A did not raid the mass. No landlords or confiscations possible. Wounded badly situated. Peng's arrival welcomed because on the way they had seized property from the rich, including clothing and food. Peng presented them with \$2,000 and they built a hospital called the "Red Light" which held 500 soldiers. On Dec 7 had a memorial meeting for Canton uprising at Ninghuan Hsien. Built a stage to make speeches

& dramas. Chu & Mao had given speeches; Peng arose to speak & the stage collapsed. Soldiers believed that this must be a bad omen, for the 4th surrounding had begun. Chu Teh told them this did not matter, that to a Red a stage was of no importance. A group of partisans was sent out to secure provisions. Chu & Mao led them. Peng remained in Chiankanshan with 700 men to guard the mountain. Chingkanshan was surrounded by the White troops and fighting lasted for 4 days. The soldiers had but 8 to 10 bullets left per man & there was a withdrawal. Peng was withdrawing on one side of the mountain. Due to heavy fog Peng was almost captured by the Whites. Only some distance away the White troops heard his bodyguard tell him to run quickly & called him commander. The Whites chased him, worth \$100,000 alive, \$50,000 dead & wanted the \$100,000 so did not fire at him. He ran & his bodyguard & a group of men voluntarily sacrificed their lives in defending his flight. Later he secured a horse & escaped from the pursuing troops. He was left with but 500 soldiers & 500 followers - women, workers and children. They tramped through the snow for five days, wearing thin clothes, without food, without houses. As they crossed the mountains they clung to each other to keep warm. For 28 days the White troops pursued them; they could not shake them off, because their tracks were left in the snow & easily followed. Arrived at Tsunyi hsien in southern Kiangsi. While passing the Lin Tan river they had but one small boat to cross, with the enemy only 10 li behind & the vanguard only 3 li behind them. One white soldier very near to them, Comrade Ho, had been the doorkeeper of Mao Tse-tung, and did not report the crossing. At that time the 4th army had reached Fukien & the 5th army was in Chiao T'ou (Bridge Head). 5th army then had only 283 men & 183 rifles.

-- What troops now on the front?
Changsha campaign?

When they arrived at Chia T'ou, end of Feb, 1929, (or '30?) they found a C P branch with 20 or 30 members and organizations among the peasants. Weary & exhausted, they rested here for 5 days. Peasants sent them food & clothing and immensely cheered them. After 5 days they were attacked by the Yunnan troops which had been sent to conquer them. The Yunnan troops sent a message asking them to submit, offering positions in the Yunnan Army. Reds pretended to agree & opened negotiations, but one night broke their lines and moved toward Yin Tu, 2 days from Kan Chou. A battalion of white troops was there. Reds walked 180 li in a day & night and entered city as Yunnan troops, captured the magistrate, disarmed the militia & the battalion there. Then political commissar Peng Tai-yuan, captured 300 rifles & white soldiers. Rifles & soldiers captured outnumbered total Red strength. Also seized \$10,000 in hsien government. Rested there for 1/2 day, and crossed the Yu Tu River, their force increased by 100 white soldiers, who joined the R A. Other white troops captured released, given \$5 each.

Passing the Yu Tu River they went one day to Hsiao Mi Chen, a big village, where there was a party organization. The Min Tuan were destroyed - about 100. Rested half a day & enlisted 40 men. This was about March 10. After the two wars about 50 to 60 men had been killed, but the total army with new recruits, numbered more than 400. A hundred rifles were given to the local partisans and several responsible leaders. Wounded soldiers were left with the peasants. Being pursued, the R A moved on to An Yuan hsien, 5 days distant. There was no regular garrison there & the Reds easily disposed of the min tuan, more than 100 being disarmed or killed. About 60 members in the local party & 1,000 farmers in the partisan organization. Over 100 rifles were captured here. The population of the hsien was about 200,000 and there were many rich gentry in the district. The landlords organized the min tuan & attacked the city with a great force. The Reds sent to the mountains several parties of men to hide in the mountains, going at night. They captured about 300 of the enemy & disarmed them. They were mostly peasants; the R A gave them a banquet, gave each man \$3 and released them, after distributing among them confiscated goods from the rich families. Landlords & gentry had spread propaganda that Reds stole peasants' wives, and communized them, burned all houses because only non-house-owning peasants are proletarians, killed all men above 15, killed all bound feet, etc. But the peasants captured saw that Reds did not kill bound feet, did not burn houses, did not kill old men. Peasants dispersed then told other min tuan peasants of this condition, they dispersed, and captured chief landlord in the district and brought him to An Yuan. The R A rested here 15 days & enlarged Soviet activities. Within this period called a peasant mass meeting & 30,000 peasants attended. Thus, within 15 days after R A arrival when most peasants had been mobilized to resist them, the situation had undergone a complete change, and 30,000 peasants about 15% of the total population, was mobilized by R A in a mass meeting. In An Yuan the R A created two partisan brigades and armed them, left party leaders with them, organized peasant committees & enlarged the R A.

At this time Chu & Mao captured Tingchou, in Fukien. Peng's troops went on to Juichin and captured the hsien city without resistance. The enemy (min tuan) had already fled. Juichin was 360 li north of An Yuan, about four days distant. This was in early April. In Juichin a huge mass meeting was called attended by over 20,000 people. Resting here for several days, they created partisan brigades & organized the peasants. By now Peng's ^{5th} army was about 1,000 men. Chu & Mao arrived in April from Tenghou with about 1,700 men. Thus the R A at this time totalled only about 2,700.

The C P Central at Shanghai ordered the dispersal of the partisan brigades & the enlarging of the partisan warfare, giving up the cities. Peng, Mao & Chu ordered to return to Shanghai. The Shanghai party only saw thousands of white troops surrounding them & feared they would be completely destroyed. Peng, Mao & Chu opposed this order & a week later moved to Yu Fu & recaptured it. From Yu Tu, Peng's troops returned to

Chingkanshan, leaving Chumao in Yutu. On the road captured Tsun Yun, Shang Yo, Tsun yi, three cities, and met partisan troops in that area under Li Tsan. Uniting with him & enlisting new recruits en route, the army enlarged to 1,600 men by time of return to Chingkanshan. The hospital built by R A on Chingkanshan had been burned & the 400 wounded soldiers burned in it; only their bones remained. Many houses had been burned & many peasants, by the army of Ho Chien. When they returned to Chingkanshan the peasants welcomed them as deliverers from the scourge of Ho Chien; sent delegates out 30 li beyond the interior to greet them. June, 1929.

(Chu Mao meanwhile left Yu Tu & returned to Fukien, opening partisan warfare there). Cities near Chingkanshan had all been destroyed by Ho Chien. Food was scarce; there was no clothing; even the partisans were still wearing padded clothes. Ten regiments of T'an Tao-yuan, of Lu Ti-ping (then Kiangsi chairman) Army, Chang Hsi-chang (Lu Ti-ping's army) and Chin Han-ting (Yunnan troops lent to Lu Ti-ping) had begun surrounding Chingkanshan. In early July the R A broke through the enemy lines & captured Kwi tung hsien, in south Hunan. From there, because pursued by enemy, turned to Kuantung, occupied Cheng K'ou in Jen Hua Hsien, and captured 50-60 pistols & 70 - 80 rifles. Next occupied Nan Hsiang (Returned to Chingkanshan) In Nan Hsiang 1,000 garrison forces. Reds entered the city through a break in the wall & captured 200 rifles. Pested in Nan Hsiung 2 weeks; attacked by 8 regiments of Canton troops. R A organized a partisan group in northern Kuantung & in August returned to Chingkanshan. On this trip repaired clothes & secured money. Helped peasants on Chingkanshan ruined by white troops.

At the end of August civil wars broke out everywhere. In the north Tan Shen-chih began his revolt against Chiang Kai-shek. Chen Chi-tang was righting Li Tsung-en & Pai Chung-hsi. The R A decided to attack Anfu in Kiangsi. When R A left Chingkanshan & arrived at Yang hsien a conference was called to consider how to attack Anfu. The Yung Hsing Hsien C P leader was a Fascist spy. (A.B. clique, or antibolshevik, organized by Chiang at Nanchang, formerly known as S.M.) The Hung Hsing member was an A.B. member & joined in the conference. When R A began attack of Anfu he informed white troops and they rushed reinforcements to Anfu. Made disposals of troops to surround Reds from two lines leading to city. The enemy were 8 regiments, less about 2,000. Reds attacked one column in hand to hand warfare and defeated it. Two R A column commanders were wounded. Commanders above company wounded & killed about 2/3; soldiers killed about 400. Enemies loss also great; Reds captured 400 rifles. Returned to Manpien to rest. It was already September, 1929.

From September to October 1929 the troops moved from Nanpun to Pingkiang, in south Hunan and met HuangKung-lun's troops there. Huang had been regimental school president and joined in the uprising; a soviet district had been created there. Pinhuang @ 200 li from Changsha. Troops rested; then divided into 5 columns, each one 600 to 800 men, altogether about 3,400 men. Huang & Peng remained in Pingkiang. Others directed to other districts to start soviets.

9 (During the difficult days on 2nd visit at Chingkanshan the troops had little to eat but grass. They had no salt. Their legs welled up to twice normal size and they grew very weak. At that time Peng's political Commissar, his chief of staff, his propagandist, all left him. He had to become all those himself. Later on two of them returned to R A and have loyally remained here ever since.

In December 1929 Huang & Peng left Pinkiang & went to Yung Hsu. The pinghoang district had raided by the Whites, crops destroyed & burned, and many houses destroyed. In December captured Chian, and destroyed nearly one brigade of T' an Tao-yuan (Lu Ti-ping's) troops. At this time the 3rd army was formed. Up till then there were only the 5th (Peng) and the 4th (Chumao). The 3rd Army was placed under Huang's command. In Feb. the 3rd Army was left to conduct partisan war in Hsui Kuo (Prosperous Country). Yung Hsung, Chi-an and Tai-ko. The 5th Army moved to Anfu & captured it this time. Ning-an hsien city was ^{still} in Red hands; first hsien city to be occupied. Also now occupied were Sui Chuan & Yang Hsing hsien cities. Peng led 5th Army to capture Anfu & 600 or 700 min tuan destroyed and several machine guns, which originally belong to Peng's regiment, were retaken. Peng had lent them to him when he said he was a revolutionary; now wrote a letter & said he was taking them back. Regimental commander replied, told him not to be so proud, he would soon have them back and more. Peng captured him in 1931.

Next captured Fen Yi, Hsu Yu, and Yuan Chou (now called Yi Chuan). In Yuan Chou Lu Ti-ping had many new recruits being trained; after Reds captured city these troops were used to supplement 5th Army, which increased to 4,000 men. Masses here very good: Built own leaders and helped them occupy the city.

After the rest in Yi Chuan again surrounded by enemy. Reds retreated to Lu K'on, south of the city. In Lou Kou fought Chang Hui-chang (Lu Ti-ping) and destroyed majority of his troops. Chang did not know of Reds arrival although within 10 li of him. Sovietized peasants refused to tell him. Early morning Reds attacked from both sides, captured 1,000 rifles, 80 machine guns, 20 trench mortars, \$100,000 cash, and scored an energetic victory. The R A enlarged to 5,000; newly equipped soldiers armed; 50 to 60,000 bullets taken. Army reorganized & new recruits trained for a week. Moved to Tung men shih of Lu Yang hsien & fought Ho Chien, and defeated a part of his troops. In May captured Chang Shou Chien in Pinkiang hsien; May 7th took Pinkiang; a brigade in the city was destroyed. This was 1930.

There was a great famine in Pingkiang & the militarists armies could get no food. R A had no difficulty; it was an old Soviet area & peasants dug up grain from the ground to feed Reds. When R A came the peasants came out with umbrellas & fans to greet them. Attacked by the enemy the R A retreated to Shou Shui, in Kiangsi. Two battalions were guarding the city. The

R A attacked, killed one batt. commander, captured another, destroyed two battalions. Moved to Yang Hsing Hsun of Hopen. Failed to capture the city & retreated to Shan Hsi H'on, a district already sovietized by Li Tsan, one of 5 columns leaders mentioned above. Masses very welcome. Red guards here all had uniforms with rifles & spears. Peasants came out 100 li to welcome Reds, When mass meeting called over 100,000 peasants attended. Peasants acted as nurses voluntarily; carried wounded and dead back from the front. There were several severe but indecisive wars. Red dead mounted to 1,000 killed, but R A was enlarged. A week later an attack was made on Tayeh, an industrial city; here are Honyehping iron mines. When Reds came the ry. workers raised Red banner themselves & welcomed army. Following capture of city Kuo Ju-tung's Szechuan troops were chased to the border of Hangtse River. The R A preparing to capture and destroy his forces there. This was in early June, 1930.

At this point, Huang Shih Kang, on Yangtse, 60 li from Tayeh, Japanese gunboats landed marines and ordered Reds to withdraw. Reds replied it was Chinese territory & they would resist any interference. Reds then attacked the Japanese & many peasants joined in this war, enthusiastic because against foreign imperialists. Japs withdrew to gunboats. Reds occupied Huang Shih Kang & confiscated Jap storehouse. Then Jap gunboats and American & British, altogether more than 20, bombarded the city. R A then about 6 to 7,000; peasants who joined in about 60,000. Foreigners continued bombardment for two days, until White troops arrived. R A withdrew to Tayeh, and here fought an engagement with White troops & defeated them. The 8th Army was created & the total strength of R A increased to 8,000 men. The 15th Army, with strength of 2,000 was also created at this time.

Li Li-san's line now penetrated to them. Li was urging an attack on Wuhan. Now most of the Red troops were green; trusted ones & experienced had many of them been killed or eliminated. Peng for this reason refused consider the adventure, but the Trotskyists in the Army supported it. The 15th Army was sent north of the river to the Hunan-Hupeh-Anhui district; later it became the nucleus of the 4th Front Army. The main forces of the RA then moved toward Changsha. En route it occupied Hsien Ning (hsien) city, Tung Ch'eng (hsien city) Yo Yang, P'u Hsi, Yang Lo Sze.

Yo Yang is communication center between Hunan & Hupeh. The customs house was seized & the fortifications destroyed. Concessions were recovered; some British officials were released. Again attacked by foreign gunboats; Japanese, American, and British. Most of houses near Yayong destroyed by gunfire. A British merchant ship was captured & burned. Three days & three nights fighting; then Chiang Kai-shek's troops arrived from the river & 19th Route Army came from Changsha. Reds surrounded. District full of lakes and situation not good. RA enlarged by 1,000. Confiscations were made from Japanese merchants & Chinese rich; goods distributed among the masses.

At that time HoFung was across the river at Hung Lake.

Red flags on both sides of river, at night 5th Army sent supplies to Ho Lung. After battle & increase of troops, R A suddenly withdrew to Ping Kiang (Peace River) leaving two columns of enemy troops to close in on a quarry already fled. This is the peculiar feature of guerrilla warfare: to attack hard and swift & repeatedly, until outnumbered & surrounded & then to withdraw suddenly from main arena of fighting, leaving enemy at end of long grip, with extended communications and heavy expense, but no quarry.

9 Capture of Changsha. Withdrawal from Yo Yang to Pinkiang occurred middle of July. On July 17 held memorial meeting of Pinkiang uprising (which happ. on July 22). Six regiments attacked Reds on July 18, from Changsha. Reds destroyed two & pursued the others. At Chin Ching the enemy was reinforced by one brigade & made another stand. Ho Chin defeated & a regiment destroyed. Went to Longli Shih next, and crossed river by boat. From there on was a great riceland that stretched to Yang Chia Shan, a mountain. Reds attacked it in order to enter the city of Changsha. This stronghold was attacked six times. Enemy's front lines extended 7 or 8 li; enemy force very great, had guns and machine guns. After 7th attack the Reds company commanders and above were all wounded or killed, with exception of one company. That company was finally sent around Mt. & posted on a higher neighboring point. Shouted to Reds that commander (Peng) was already there. This stimulated Reds, made a seventh attack & occupied mt. This opened road to Changsha. The battle continued for 7 - 8 hours.

Next day RA moved on Changsha, where there was a defending force of 9 regiments, 5 regulars & 4 police min tuan. R A had 9,000 men. First attack unsuccessful. Renewed assault at night & captured city. Entered Changsha on July 22nd. Wounded and dead 2,700. Enemy's wounded & killed 4,000. 7,000 rifles captured, 5 airplanes, 8 mountain guns, 200 trench mortars and many bullets, both gun & rifle. Occupied Changsha for 10 days. Red Army enlarged by nearly 10,000, most of recruits coming from iron workers, peasants, ricksha men, and others of proletariat.

Reds did not destroy foreign property nor foreigners. Did not burn bldgs. Fascists left in city organized an uprising of 1,000 to 2,000 and attempted disarm Reds. Burned many houses, & ransacked Jap Consulate & foreign missions. Reds did not loot. A confiscation committee formed, & took over property of usurers & KMT officials. Fascists arrested; 30 killed; rest released. Fascists had captured 40 Reds who had gone to console White wounded; buried them alive.

Established a 16th Red Army here with new rifles.

Ho Chien's bodyguard captured. Ho himself escaped on a Japanese motor boat to opposite bank and took refuge in a waving & spinning factory. On the 24th the Japanese gunboats landed marines in Shui I'o Chou (Land & Water Island). There was a glass factory & an ide factory there, both owned by Japanese. When Jap gunboat landed Marines the RA lined up guns on the riverside, behind the greenery, and when Jap gunboat approached opened fire. The distance very short, most shells took effect. Japanese gunboat received much damage and

withdrew. Reds bombarded Hai Lo Chou & destroyed Japanese glass factory & ice factory.

Masses in Changsha captured the Japanese shops; in 1122 the Jap marines there had killed some Chinese workers, water-carriers & ricksha pullers, aroused their resentment, which hadn't been forgotten. RA established two papers here in this short time. One called "Red Army" another "The Soviets". Announced foreign police of peace with foreigners & foreign countries. Wrote to foreign consulates same news. On Aug 1 a Provincial Soviet was established; 300,000 people attended. Masses from outside districts attended the celebration. During the 10 days stay in Changsha the counter-revolutionaries made many disturbances. Red force small; confusion during reorganization. Street fighting every day; terrorized city; set fire to poor men's houses; a whole street burned; propagandized that the Reds had done it. But poor men saw that the Red soldiers carried water to put out fires. KMT also set fire to educational institutions, a survey bureau, the Jap consulate, school buildings, killed many Red soldiers & ~~many~~^{many} citizens.

Jap gunboats carried Ho Chien's troops to protect Chinese transports to attack the city. Red Army withdrew from Changsha on Aug 2. During retreat destroyed one enemy regiment. Here more than 300 students joined the Reds. Retreating from Changsha they again captured Yo Yang. (16th Army created at Changsha now is part of Hsiao Keh's 6th Army Corps, by 1934 enlarged to 14,000. RA now numbered 17,000. Hsiao's troops, the 16th Army, stayed in Ping-Kiang in the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border soviet district.

Peng's opinion of the Changsha adventure.

"It was good in that it stimulated the whole country & showed that it was possible for the RA to capture great cities. It was bad in that it seemed to prove soundness of Li Li-san's line, it also stimulated the White troops and brought about organization of the First Extermination Campaign, it resulted in 2nd and disastrous attempt on city. Because we did not clearly understand the political role of RA then we lost great opportunities. If Changsha had been captured as part of the partisan warfare it would have been a good move. The mistake was in regarding it as a position to be held & consolidated. Result was that RA had to retreat leaving behind thousands in silver, most of trench mortars and guns, airplanes, abundant munitions.

The 15th, 16th, 8th, 5th Armies, altogether called 3rd army corps, had captured Changsha; it now withdrew to outside the city, to Geng Men. Enemy's troops pursuing in three columns. Chu Mao had arrived in a neighboring town; each army destroyed an enemy column & enemy withdrew to Changsha. Chu-Mao & Peng met at Yungho of Fugang and began surrounding of Changsha, from Aug to middle of Sep. Enemy had 35 regiments & clung to city. Only one encounter outside city & enemy withdrew, defeated. After a month no success on Sept 20 Reds withdrew through a line extended through over 50 hsien, then in Red hands. Main forces arrived at Suichin in October.

Partisan War

Peng Teh-huai, August 25, 1936

The main cause of partisan warfare in China is economic bankruptcy & especially rural bankruptcy. Militarist wars have destroyed the economic basis of rural economy; enormous taxes, together with imperialist economic invasion, speed up the rate of peasant bankruptcy. Feudal landlords & gentry, whose exploitation & power in the villages make life difficult for the majority of peasants. There is tremendous unemployment in the villages. This is one of the objective causes.

Secondly, because of backwardness both in economy and the mountainous terrain, cut up by rivers, & poor communications.

Third, China is cut up by imperialists who use their spheres of interest to divide Chinese people. Between these spheres, these gaps in Chinese control, it is possible to conduct partisan warfare.

Fourth, during the Great Revolution, the revolutionary idea was firmly rooted in the minds of many. Because of the White Terror in the cities after c-rev. the rev workers & peasants returned to rural and backward districts & led the peasant resurrections. The peasants living condition provided necessary milieu for their activity. This is a subjective cause.

All these are factors contributing to growth & success of rev. partisan warfare. All are simple and do not go into the deepest analysis.

Besides the above basic reasons, the partisan warfare is successful & partisan detachments are invincible because of identity of the masses with the fighting forces. Red partisan groups are not only warriors; they are at the same time political propagandists & organizers of the masses. In their activities wherever they arrive they immediately spread the widest propaganda, making the peasants understand that revolution is the only way for the realization of their demands & the C P the only party which can lead them, and bringing to them a new sense of dignity. Besides this discipline of R A is excellent; no conflict with interests of the masses. Even a small unit, say 100 men, every one is a propagandist as well as a warrior. For this reason the partisan becomes the main builder of Soviet districts & the vanguard of the R A.

In some districts partisan warfare developed very rapidly; elsewhere very easily suppressed. Why? In partisan warfare necessary to have correct bolshevik line & leadership; must have deep & broad work among the masses; leadership must be determined & courageous. Without these conditions partisan warfare not only cannot develop, it must wither under reactionary offensive.

Because the masses are interested only in the practical solution of their economic problems, it is only possible to develop the partisan warfare by immediate satisfaction of their demands. Without struggle, mass organizations cannot develop soviets. Any peacefully-created mass organization is easily liquidated by the reactionary landlords & gentry. Without struggle it is impossible

to identify the real friend & the real warrior for revolutionary change.

Partisans must constantly expand, building around themselves ever-new peripheral & protective groups. Political training must go hand in hand with struggle & local leaders must be created out of every group. Leaders from the outside can be introduced but no lasting success can be built on their direction alone. Best leaders of local units local people trained by party. Without them the ablest Marxist scholars & commanders from the outside are powerless.

Principle tactics of guerrilla warfare:

1st - the partisans must not fight any losing battles. Without the likelihood of success they should refuse any encounter.

2nd - surprise attack is the main offensive tactic of partisans and a long & positional warfare must be avoided. The partisan brigade has no auxiliary force, no rear, no line of supplies except that of the enemy. The enemy has every advantage in a lengthy war, and the longer the engagement lasts the less chance there is of success.

3rd - careful plan of attack & retreat must be worked out in full detail before any engagement is accepted. An engagement undertaken without these preliminaries opens the partisans to outmaneuver by the enemy.

4th - In the development of partisan warfare the greatest attention must be paid to the mintuan, the first, last & most determined line of the landlords & gentry. The mintuan must be destroyed militarily, but must if at all possible be won over politically. Unless the min tuan is eliminated the mobilization of the mass is impossible.

5th - When the partisan brigade has war with the regular troops the partisans must exceed them in number, but if the enemy's regular troops are moving, resting, or poorly guarded, they must be attacked with swiftness & decision.

6th - In fighting the partisan line must have great elasticity. Once it becomes obvious that their calculation of enemy strength or fighting power is in error, the fighting must be quickly terminated.

7th - In tactics, the principle must be adopted of "pretending to attack the east while attacking the west."

8th - They must avoid engagements with the main force of the enemy & concentrate on the weakest link or the most vital.

9th - Their activities must always be swift and their movements secret.

10th - Partisans in every war must have these qualities: must be determined, fearless, swift, secret and sudden in their actions. Lacking one of these it is difficult for partisans to secure victory. If in the beginning of the war they are not fully determined, the war will be lengthened. They must be swift, otherwise the enemy will be reinforced. They must be secret; if they are not the enemy either will have fled or strengthened & prepared itself. Partisans must be careful when entering a new district, during the night changing their resting place at least once.

Partisan warfare is a movement of the armed masses. Only by building itself deeply in the needs of the masses, only by sheltering in the shadow of the masses, can they hope to win victory.

Hsu Hai-tung with three others once "surrounded" a big town in Huangpi and sent an ultimatum to min tuan, demanding \$1,000. There were 100 min tuan in the town. They refused the demand & came out of the city to fight the Reds. Hsu was hiding in a temple near the main road; one other was in a ditch; one was in a tree. Hsu fired from temple at commander of Min tuan, riding a horse, and killed him. The man in tree picked off an officer; man from ditch fired at others. Hsu then rushed out & fired his automatic at min tuan, killing 7 men with 10 shots. The min tuan, fired at from several directions, dropped their arms & fled to the city. Hsu & his three comrades collected 30 rifles & regretted the inability to carry more. By time min tuan returned to fight, discovering their enemy only 4 men, they had already escaped. This incident became famous story all over the hsien & many peasants were influenced by it to join Hsu Hai-tung.

Hsu wounded first time by a Red spear. Wounded in every campaign, has altogether 8 wounds - two in legs, one on arm, two in head (under one eye and behind left ear) another on hip, one through chest, one in shoulder. His right arm partly useless due to bullet; cannot be raised to shoulder height. Hsu's two front teeth knocked out when he fell from a horse, trying to avoid a pedestrian. Knocked senseless; did not recover for two months. News went out he was seriously wounded by air-bombing; a govt pilot claimed to have hit him & Chiang Kai-shek paid him \$5,000 reward.

Biog of Hsu Hai-tung

Born in Huangpi hsien, Hupeh, in a small village in 1900. From time of his grandfather his family engaged in making earthen water jars & silos. In his grandfather's time the family was middle peasantry in his father's time they became proletarianized & worked in a clay-baking kiln. In these kilns from 10 to 60 people were employed. There were six brothers and two sisters, Hai-tung the youngest. His father & five brothers worked in the kiln; his sixth brother was adopted by his uncle & later became a school teacher. This kind of workers (handicraft) were ambitious and progressive; he was the youngest and the family sent him to school. Studied at same desks with sons of landlords and often fought with them. If he was beaten and ran to the teacher to ask for help he was invariably punished; if landlords sons beaten & asked for help he was also punished. When he was 11 he hit a child named Huang. Hid behind a door during a rich-poor school fight & threw a stone at the crowd when attacked; stone cut the rich boy's head. Huang's family came to the school & beat him; followed by teacher; followed by his own father, who disowned him. This made a deep impression on him; realized that it was impossible for poor boy to get justice. He left school. He had attended school $3\frac{1}{2}$ years.

In the same year his father put him in the kiln as an apprentice. For three years he received no salary. He was 11 years old when he began to work. In the first year he had to supply his own clothes, and wait on the master's table, serving food, boiling tea, helping the mistress. This year was called "Thanking the master year."

When he was 16 he had become a full journeyman & he went to Hsiao Kan hsien in the same hsien & began to work there. He had become the most skilled worker in Huang P'i, but he was still young & the factory master looked down upon him also because he was well-dressed. Master said he was a landlord's son; too well-dressed. In February he began to work there; in March he was recognized as the most skillful worker out of 300 workers. The master now changed his attitude, but Hai-tung did not like him, had not forgotten his original affronts. In May he told the master he wanted to quit; the master did not want to lose him: he sent him 15,000 cash (about \$12) besides regular wage. His annual wage was about 150,000 cash - a very high wage for this kind of worker. Food was furnished; he provided his own clothes; slept in the master's home. He decided to return to work & stayed there for 3 years.

Within an area of 8 li there were four of these great factories & the workers were all well acquainted. They often played together. During his 3rd year at the factory he went with about 300 workers to see a drama in a neighboring town. The family of the local gentry and garrison commander were also there, in a special box & it was prohibited to look into it, for the gentry's women were there. But the workers could not help looking in, even though they were some distance away. The gentry's guard ordered them to leave the theatre; workers refused. Guard attacked them; workers replied with chairs, benches, etc., & defeated the min tuan, ending by destroying the box. Later on the gentry were unable to find a single worker to blame, more than 300 having been in the theatre; Therefore they accused the factory owners, especially Hsu's. In order to compensate the factory owner had to invite 30 tables of guests to a feast & shoot off firecrackers.

Factory owner became very depressed. The feast had cost him over 200 chuan (200,000 cash) & he decided to reduce the workers' wages. The workers organized & decided to quit en masse if he did so & he was afraid to carry out his plan. This was Hsu's first experience in the effectiveness of mass organization & action. He was then 18 years old. Shortly afterward he decided anyway to return home. A good job was open there, his family told him, & they wanted him to come back.

Returning from Hsiao Kan he worked in Huang P'i. His family found a wife for him when he was 19; by then his eldest brother was blind. His nephews, brothers, sister-in-law made a big family but their working ability was poor & the family was always in debt. He provided the greater support of the whole family; feelings were nevertheless good & they did not like to separate. His wife felt that her position was more important than others; she quarrelled

a great deal; she wanted him to leave the big family. His parents were somewhat afraid of her; they were dependent upon him. When he was 21 his wife made a great scene & demanded that he leave home. He became infuriated & beat her & only stopped when his brothers pulled him away. He felt that this kind of life was intolerable & he left next day for somewhere else.

After leaving home he decided to go to Kwangsi, to work in the kilns there. He had \$1 & a few coppers, the clothes on his back and an umbrella. He walked the 240 li to Hankow in a day and a night.

At Hankow he met a friend from his home town and he asked Hsu what he was doing there. He said he was going there to find a friend of his uncle. The friend told him it cost \$3 to go by steamer from Hankow to Kinkiang. Neither had so much money; the friend advised him to get on board without a ticket. He did so & on and when the steward came to collect his ticket he told him he had nothing but \$1. After lengthy bargaining he was allowed to go on to Kinkiang. Having reached Kinkiang he had no money. He walked in a day & a night the 180 li to Ma Hui Ling, en route to Nanchang. 35 li from there were the factories where he expected to work. It was already night. Meeting on the street a ^{refactor?}retailer of pottery he opened a conversation with him, using the language of his profession, told him his story, was befriended, given a meal and bed, & next day sent on to the factories. After three months he became ill; unused to the southern weather. (Factory located at Huang tou pu). He had earned 50,000 cash, most of which was spent on clothes and bedding; he had no reserve; when he recovered he was in debt 70,000 cash to the master. (He had cholera there).

It took a year for him to clear this debt. By that time he had become homesick & he wanted to return but had no money. It is a shameful thing in China for a youth to go forth in the world & then return without any money. He was 23 or 24 years old. Fan Rei-wen, then ~~manhannmmmm~~ fuchun of Kiangsi was recruiting new troops; he sent men to enlist soldiers at Huang tou pu & thinking he might earn some money that way Hsu joined the army. The recruiting officer had promised the workers that every month each soldier would receive \$10 per month and food & clothes provided.

For three months he did soldier's work, received many kicks & many blows, but no salary. He learned quickly, however & in 1925 became a squad commander. In 1926 the great revolution had begun & the Northern Expedition reached Kiangsi. Some comrades talked to him about the C P but he did not join.

At this time, while in Fang Peng-jen's troops he became good friends with his company squad commander a Hupeh man & dissatisfied with Fang. Persuaded Hsu to desert. Together they went to Canton & joined the KMT troops, entering Chung Fuh-Kwei's 4th Army. Went north to Kiangsi under general command of Li Chi-sun. Victorious. After this Hsu, being near home (only one day) decided to return to Huang Pi. He had an officer's belt but he still had no money. He had become a platoon commander.

In 1927 he returned to Huang P'i & began working again in the kiln. When he returned home had was wearing a platoon commander's uniform with a belt and the local people called him "officer" in his own kiln. The revolution was still petty bourgeois. He joined the party & immediately came out with the workers struggle, beginning.

When Hsu joined the C P he was the only real proletarian in the local CP, the rest being sons of landlords & merchants. He immediately became platoon commander of the Peasant Guard, then a legal body. The Peasant Guard began confiscations of property & land & Hsu was most determined in this work. Two months later occurred Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolution & troops were sent to suppress them. By the winter of 1927 the Peasant Guard which immediately changed name to "Red Guards" had been dissolved & most of the local C P's had either "confessed" and joined the KMT or run away. Hsu was especially wanted by the local gentry, and he fled to a nearby mountain, where he remained in hiding for several weeks. At night he came to town & called on C P members, trying to organize them. Some received him & gave him financial help; others refused to talk to him. By the spring of 1928 he had added 16 proletarians (peasants and 2 kiln workers) & one student. They had one revolver between them & 8 bullets. They had no connection with the party, they did not know whether any other partisans were operating; they only felt that it was necessary to struggle & work to build a new party. In addition to the 17 men, Hsu organized 5 party branches in the neighborhood, among proletarians who had formerly known him, among those who had received confiscated goods, among the kiln workers; largest had 30 members, 2/3 of them kiln workers.

The 17 men did not understand Marxism, they only knew that Hsu had a party connection, they trusted him, they hated the landlords & masters, & they had a heroic idea that if they died they would die together, fighting and to help the poor.

During this period the students continued to meet him at night, although during the day they could not get out, their families guarded them. He found best refuge with the peasants, however; but later on even they were closely watched. The gentry of Huang Pi together subscribed \$16,000 for reward for his capture, dead or alive.

Hsu knew the outline of Marxism then, knew the principles of the land revolution, and felt great confidence in their fundamental necessity. While in the 4th army their slogan was to fight the gentry and the landlords and this appealed to him; the CP's in the 4th army also lectured & explained basic Marxism to him. When he returned to his native town, with this background he easily joined the party. The student, Tien Kan-san had read much Marxist literature, and was with him constantly, & had much influence on him. Under his tutelage he came to understand fully the nature of class relationships, and the class struggle. He understood the meaning of the proletarian dictatorship and this especially inspired him to work with all his

energy for the revolution.

The 17 men who called themselves the "Red Guard" (also the Peasant Self-Defence Army, the Red Partisan Brigade & other names, to confuse the enemy) captured a rich landlord & demanded \$1,000 from him. With this they bought some native-made pistols, which fired only one bullet - a rifle bullet. These guns are made wholly of iron, about a foot long, barrels are very big and inaccurate; short distance firing. Bought 13 of these pistols; only 4 would work. With these they began partisan warfare in the district in February, 1928. Two months later the gentry drove his family (father, mother, all sons & wives) from the neighborhood and burned their houses. At that time none of his family had any pol. connection with him. His wife was captured by the KMT troops and sold by them to a family called Wei, in Hsiao Kan (as a concubine?) 13 members of Hsu's family killed.

Huangpi is one of richest places in Hupeh. Surrounding his family house were three great landlord's estates. Rice, peanuts and oil made from seeds of a plant extensively grown & shipped to America grown here. Lo Shan (Honen) Huan P'I (Hopeh) and Huang An, Ma Chen, Hsiao Kan, border regions, were first sovietized. Approximately 40% of pop. are poor farmers, 30% middle farmers, 20% small landlords, 10% big landlords. About 60% of land held by big and small landlords. Poor peasants hold from 0 to 5 or 6 mou. Great landlords' holdings average about 1,000 to 2,000 mou; the biggest in Huang Pi had 4,000 mou (about 700 acres). Four or five families out of 100 would be great landlords with 1,000 to 2,000 mou. In Hupeh are 108 districts & biggest pop @ 100,000; total exceeds 800,000: biggest hsien in Hupeh. Many absentee landlords.

Partisan warfare continued with 5 pistols. The landlords' property was distributed among the masses, & friendly feeling established. In April a connection was established with the C P, party organization was extended to Huang An & others. Secured 13 rifles, 2 pistols, in fight with min tuan, & 20 native-made pistols. "Army" enlarged to 39 men & all "armed." In June the partisan brigades of Huang P'I & Ma Cheng hsien combined. The combination increased force to 70 men. In October had enlarged to over 100 men & the partisan district was 100 li from south to north & east to west. With these men support from the peasantry quickly increased & the masses gave protection to them everywhere. Leadership from the special committee of northeastern Hupeh also helped them very greatly. They moved as far as 200 li on each side of their own region & operated over a distance of 500 li. End of 1928.

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