

Interview continued from Book 13 to Book 14 from back to front.

Interview with Mao Book 14 Back to Front.

I believed their charges vs. Germany & was glad Chian was fighting vs such a barbarous people. At the same time I sympathize with the Russian Revolution.

I had become active in the student movement & especially after the May 4th Movement devoted most of my time to it. The Hsiang Chiang Review, the Hunan students' paper, of the May 4th Movement, was edited by me. We found a society called The Cultural Book Society (Wen-Hua Shu Hui)

Chiang Ching-yao was then "tuchun" of Hunan & was a vicious fellow. Hsin Min Hsueh Hui led a general strike of students against him. We sent delegations to Peiping & the Southwest to fight against him. The Hsiang Chiang Review was suppressed by him. We were divided into three groups; those who had gone to Peiping, those in the S.W., and those who remained in Changsha. I went to Peiping, The Hsin Min Hsueh Hui led the anti-militarist movement. I was leading the activities in Peiping. We were successful; Tan Yen-Kai's troops overthrew Chiang Ching Yao & in the north I was organizing a news agency for overthrowing militarism. In the Hsin Min Hsueh Hui there was a split into the Left wing & right wing.

I arrived in Peiping in 1918, and immediately sought out & met Chen Tu-hsin & Hu Shih. For the first time I saw the scenery of North China. I saw the early spring, with white plum blossoms flowering while the ice was still over Pei Hai Lake. I saw the thousands of trees of Peiping & was impressed by the beauty of the old capital. Saw the trees over Pei Hai, with ice crystals hanging "like 10,000 peach trees blossoming" (described by a poet of the Tang Dynasty - Chen Chang)

In 1919 I went to Shanghai & met again with Chen Tu-hsin. We organized a League for the Reconstruction of Hunan & I returned and began to teach. Our New People's Study Group had a program for a Hunan Kuo - independence of Hunan. (Interjection: But you were now a young man of 2, and yet there is no mention of romance in your life. Were you already married?)

I had no time for romance. We all considered the times too critical to discuss love or personal matters or women. I did not discuss buying a piece of meat with anybody. One night I was in the house of a friend and he ordered servant to buy him a piece of meat. I did not see him again. My parents had married me at 15 to a woman of 20. for equality of men & women, a democratic program. equal economic & political rights. We issued a paper called Hsin Hunan. We led an attack on the Provincial House of Representatives, the majority of whom were landlords, and pulled down the scrolls & banners from the walls. It was a big incident.

"I was correspondent for the Peiping Chen Dao & special contributor to the Hunan Ta Kung Pao. (The Ta Kung Pao and some other papers were organized by Mao, and was led by the Hsin Min Hsueh Hui in promoting democracy.)

In 1920 (2nd trip) the Young Socialist League was organized semi-legally. Next year began to organize the C. P. in Hunan.

(Begin here 1st trip) First trip to Peiping was in Summer of 1918. Took no money with him to Peiping - lived by borrowing from friends. In the 5 years he spent in normal school he spent only \$1.60. Every month spent 1.00 for a newspaper & his father cursed him for wasting money on wasted paper. From 1911 to 1927, when he climbed up to Chinganshan, he never stopped reading newspapers - Peiping, Shanghai, & Hunan. His father died in the winter of 1919. His mother died in 1918. During Ta Ke Ming he used rent from the land to carry on peasant movement. Now seized by Chiang K Shek. That winter (1918) raised a big movement for sending students to France - to "write & learn"; among those who went: Tsai Ho-sen, Lo Man, Hsiao Tse-ch'ang, Li Li-san & others. Before leaving they studied French from Li Shih-tsen now president of Sino-French University. Old man Hsu influenced by this movement; went to France. Mao organized the movement and it was supported by the Hsin Min Hsueh Hui, he did not want to go because wanted to study Sino problems. Did not study French. To Peita

Mao introduced to Peita library by his former Ethics teacher, then prof. in Peita, he got job as assistant librarian under Li Ta-chao @ \$8.00 per month. He lived at San Yen Ching (Three Eyes Well), & slept on a K'ang with 7 other people, so tightly packed they could scarcely breathe. His position so low people avoided him. His job was to register people who came to read the newspapers. When they signed their names he read them & recognized many famous names; Fu Ssu-hien, Lo Chia-lun, and others & wanted to talk to them, but they had no time for him. He joined the Philosophical Society & Society of Journalism in order to be able to audit classes in Peiping. In the Journalism Society were several co-listeners such as Chen Kung-po and Tan Ping-shen (could not talk to them.). He knew Chang Kuo-tuo at Peita, also Tuan Chi-p'ang (now vice-minister of education). Kang P'ei-cheng (went to Cal & joined "Ku Klux Klan". Here he met Yang Ke-hui, the daughter of the returned student from England, ethics prof of Peita and with cousin of Yang Kai-hui.

He read of anarchy in some pamphlets & agreed with the ideas: it proposed. A student in Peiping U. named Chu Hsun-pei visited him frequently to discuss anarchism.

In the winter of 1918 I went to Shanghai with students going to France. I had a ticket only to Tientsin & no money for further on. There is a Compté School in Peiping; a friend received \$10.00 from there & bought a ticket for him. He stopped off at Chufon & visited Confucius' grave and visited where Confucius students bathed their feet in a small stream, & visited Tai Shan also. At Pukon he was again broke & a thief stole his shoes. Stopped in the inn where Yen Hui, one of Confucius' famous students, once saw the tree planted by one of Conf. students lived.

But "heaven will not deter one's way" and as I went out of the station I saw an old friend from Hunan. The friend lent him money for shoes & a ticket to Shanghai & he safely reached there. A big sum of money had been raised to send the students to France & he had an allowance to go back to Hunan.

High marks, (as rated by Mao); walked on the ice of Pei Hai (gulf of), saw Tai Shan, visited Confucius' grave; walked around Lung T'ing Lake, walked around city wall of Paotingfu, around the wall of Hsueh (famous in San Kuo), & the wall of Nanking.

(This is the end of the first trip to Peiping; should be placed before the other story.) Insert B "A"

(Note: A peasant in Hunan, tilling Mao's old land, saw an airplane fly overhead & heard that it was a Red Army airplane, who returned to see whether Chiang Kai-shek had cut down the trees on his land! Mao remarked that on the basis of the new United Front Policy he is entitled to return of his ~~property~~ land. Many people might say that was the whole secret of his ~~xxxxxx~~ advocating this policy.) (If the trees had been cut down he feared they would have to compensate.)

Continue with 2nd trip.

At the Hunan Kuo Period T'an Yen-K'ai was driven out by a militarist who ~~utilized~~ our movement. He militarist Chao Hun-~~ai~~ who utilized our movement. He gave his support to us on the basis of a United Autonomous Province, so we were forced to reverse our position & oppose him. In 1921 we wished to celebrate the 3rd Anniversary of the October Prohibition, and to raise the Red Flag; police interfered. In our Hunan institution we had (according to 12th article) the right to organize. The policemen ignored that & said that the constitution did not matter, what he was doing was at the Governor's order.

Talk of nothing of which you know everything. Listen to everything of which you know nothing.

In the winter of 1920 I began to organize workers politically for the first time. By May 1, 1922, we had already organized more than 20 labor unions among railway workers and others. In the summer of 1921 the first conference of the C.P. was called in Shanghai. I with one other

comrade from Hunan, participated in this first Congress. Chang Kuo-tuo, Chen Kung-po, Pao Hui-Beng, Chou Ku-hai, attended - altogether 12. In October the first provincial C.P. was set up in Hunan & that winter began the labor movement in Hunan. In the following spring there were many strikes, most of them victorious. These examples helped to establish new labor unions - railway, mines, municipal works, the mint, printers - altogether over 20. By May 1, 1922 we had already organized more than 20 labor unions among railway workers and others. On May 1st we called a general strike. At that time the work of the party was concentrated on two branches - students & workers.

Most of the big mines were already organized & there were many struggles; on the student front struggles were numerous also. In the winter of 1922 Tieh (H. Governor) illes Huang Ai, and Pang Yuan-ch'ing, Hunanese workers. I went to Shanghai to help organize the movement vs. Chao & after a short time returned. Trade Unions at that time were organized into one provincial union of syndicates. Anarchists were influential among the trade unions. We negotiated with them in order to prevent precipitate actions led by them. In the labor movement we fought also against the Right Wing - students from the Industrial School; Huang Ai, one of the two killed, led this wing. We had to negotiate & compromise with them in many struggles. In 1922 the 2nd Congress of the party was held in Shanghai; I did not remember the place it was called to meet & missed it. In 1923 the Third Congress of the party was held in Canton & here a resolution was passed agreeing to enter the KMT and create a United Front against the Northern militarists. I went to Shanghai & worked in the C.C. of the Communist Party. (Insert "a" of next page) (Founders of the C.P. in China: Chen Tu-hsia, Chang Kuo-tao, Yang Min-tsai, Tah Ping-shan, Chen Kung-po, Liu Jin-chin, Yu Hsiu-sung, Shih Tseng-tung, Sun Yuan-lu, Li Han-tsen (killed in Wuhan), Li t'a, Li Sun;

In the spring of 1924 I accompanied some members of the KMT to Canton where the 1st National Congress of the KMT was held. That summer the Whomper-Military Academy was set up. In March I returned to Shanghai & worked in the C.C. of the C.P. & the Executive Bureau of the KMT in Shanghai. Other members Wang ~~Chun-wei~~ & Hu Han-min; That winter I took all & was forced to return to Hunan, to my village home, to recuperate.

Formerly I did not realize the degree of class struggle in the country, but during my stay in Hunan I organized more than 20 peasant unions.

In Shansi, Kuo Chung-yu; Peiping, Li Ta-chao, Teng Sung-hsia, Chang Kuo-tao, Lo Tsang-lun, ~~Lui Jen-ching~~ (now a Trotskyite); Canton, Lin Pei-chu, P'eng Pai; Shantung, Wang Chin-mei, Teng En-ming; in France, Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, Shiang Ching-yu, Lo Mai, Tsai Ho-sen, Germany, Kao Yuh-an, Chu Teh, Chang Sheng-fu; Moscow, Chu Chu-pai; Japan, Chou Fu-hai. *Shiang Chen-yu, wife of Tsai' Ho-sen, only woman among founders. Hupeh, Han Ying, Wen Teh-ying, Teng Pi-wu (now in party school) Hsu Pei-hao, ~~Shih Yang~~, (killed in 23)

During the May 31st movement the Hunan peasantry began to struggle vigorously; landlords wanted to arrest me. I fled to Canton. I reached Canton just at the time the Whampton students defeated Yang Hsi-ming, Kwangsi Yunnan militarist, and Lu Tsieng-wai, militarist, and Wang Ching-wei was made chairman of the Gov. Chiang Kai Shek was made first army commander.

The political dept of KMT then issued a "Political Weekly" of which I became the editor. It later played a great role, attacking the Right Wing (T'ai Chi-tuo) of the KMT. In the winter of 1925 I established a course for peasant movement workers, which had representatives from 21 different provinces, including also students from Inner Mongolia. I was president of the school, which was called "Study Course of the Chinese Movement. In the KMT I was chief of the agitprop department and candidate to the Central Committee. Lin Pei-chu was chief of peasant dept & ~~Tan~~

Ping-shan of workers dept. (Mao at this time wrote a pamphlet, called, An Analyses of the Different Classes of Chinese Society, another called The Class basis of Chao Han-ti and Our Tasks." were published in the Peasant Monthly and the Ching Nien; the second one was published in ~~ChingxKun~~, Hunan as a pamphlet. Chen Tu-hsiu opposed the first one.

In March, Chiang Kai-shek attempted his coup d'etat in Canton (March 20, 1926) and in May the 2nd Congress of the KMT was held, under the leadership of ~~HS~~ Chiang Kai-shek. Communists participated. In autumn under the United Front of the C.P. & KMT began the Northern Expedition. I participated in it. In the spring of 1926 I was sent to Shanghai to direct the peasant dept. of the C.P. and later to Hunan-Kiangsi district as inspector of the peasant movement. At Hunan I inspected 5 hsien - Changsha, Li-ling, Hsiang Tan, Heng Shan, Shang Hsiang & reported to the Central Committee on the proper line of the peasant Union. That spring, when I reached Hunan the interprovincial peasant union meeting was held - Fang Chih-min & P'eng Pai among those attending.

At that meeting I put forward a project of equal distribution of land. York & Valen, two Russian comrades, participated also. This project was adopted for proposal to the 5th Congress of the C. P. Rejected by C.C. & never proposed at Congress. At that Congress a landlord was one who had over 500 mou.

We established an all-China course for peasant-union workers; it had 1,000 students. This course was under the joint leadership of the C.P. & Left Wing KMT - myself & Teng Yen-tu (later killed by Chiang Kai-shek in Shanghai) being chiefly responsible. Under the KMT central committee there was also a peasant union committee & we were responsible there. My land program was the rejected by the C. C. of the C. P. (Mao was very dissatisfied with C. P. policy at that time, especially toward the peasant movement; he thinks if the peasant movement had been organized & armed more thoroughly the Soviets could have had an earlier development.) (Add Paragraph #2)

In May, 1926 the 5th Congress of C. P. Was held in Wuhun. The land program passed there was erroneous. In Wuchong the Chinese Union of Peasants was set up & I was president of it. On May 21 of that year began the reactionary revolt in Hunan. (HSU Ko Hsi'ang Uprising) In April the counter-revolution & massacre of workers & communists had taken place in Shanghai & Canton (?). From 1925 to 27 my main party work was with the peasant union.

Paragraph #2 This project was adopted for proposal to the 5th Congress of the C. P. ~~Rejected~~ by C.C. & was never proposed at Congress. Rejected at that Congress a landlord was one who had over 500 mou.

In the spring of '27 the peasant movement was widespread in Hunan, Hupeh, Kuangsi & Fukien & the KMT high officials & commanders became alarmed, began to show their true face, described peasant movement as excessive, called the peasant union the vagabond union. We advanced an opposite point of view (in Mao's pamphlet), but it was rejected, until after the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hunan. After the betrayal of the Wuhan government the C. P. decided to leave the KMT Party & led an insurrection in Nanchang on August 1st.

I was sent to Hunan as secretary of the Provincial Committee, and had been there for 10 days and was withdrawn by Chen Tu-hsiu, because latter accused him of organizing uprising vs. T'ang Shen-chih. Many C.P. leaders were ordered to leave - to Russia, to Szechuan, etc. Mao ordered to Szechuan, warned to flee for his life. He did not want to go and instead went to Hunan to organize the peasants - after 10 days recalled. On August 7, 1927 a meeting extraordinary of the C.C. replaced Chen Tu-hsiu as party sec. Tsai Ho-sen, Peng Kung-~~o's~~, Chu ~~phu-pai~~, Mao & others altogether 10 were present at meeting.

I became a member of the politbureau of the party after the 3rd Congress (In Canton, 1924). In August of 1927 I went to Changsha to instigate a peasant uprising - the so-called Autumn Crop Uprising. My program called for 1) separation from Left KMT; 2) organization of peasant-

worker revolutionary army; 3) confiscate the small landlords property, as well as big; 4) to set up independent power in Hunan by the C.P. without the KMT. 5) Agree with the slogan of Comintern to organize soviets (not really proposed by Comintern till later). This was program we demanded the party consider. In september the peasants revolt led by Mao occurred in Hunan and the beginning of the revolutionary peasant-workers army began with one division. (The 'first Division, First Army*. This was in the Kiangsi-Hunan-Hupeh border district. Enrolled from Li Ling, Peng Shan, Lu Yang & two others.

Recruits came from White Army troops, from labor unions & from peasants and became 1st Division of the First Workers & Peasants Revolutionary Army. Mao was leader of the Party Front Committee. We organized this army with the greement of the Provincial Committee but the program was opposed by the Central Committee of the party. I planned to organize the First Division from the Honyang miners, from the peasants & from the old white armies. I was the inspecting the miners & on the way to the peasant guards.

I was captured by the Min Tuan. The White Terror was at its height; I was taken to Changsha to be shot. I borrowed several ten dollars from a comrade on the way, to buy my release from the soldiers, who agreed, but the subaltern in charge refused to release me. On the way I tried by every means to loosen the bounds but failed. With 200 yards of the destination (Min Tuan headquarters, where I would be shot) I decided to try to escape. I broke loose & ran toward a high place above a pond with some tall grass in it. There I hid and managed to escape discovery. The soldiers searched for half a day & then movilized the inhabitants of a nearby village to continue the search. They came near to me many times, and I felt sure I would be captured.

By sunset I set off across the mountains at night. I had no shoes and the road hurt my feet. On the road I met a peasant who gave me shelter & spurred (?) me on to another district. I had \$7.00 with which I bought some shoes & an umbrella. I reached the peasant guards with 2 x coppers in my pocket. Nearby was the garrison force which had already joined the Sev. Army. With the establishment of the new division, I became chairman of the party committee in it. It's commander was Yu Sha-t'on, now working for Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking. He shortly afterward fled to the KMT districts. We had some victories, also some losses. Many wevering elements left; at last, with but 1,000 men, we reached Ching Kangshan. When they reached Ningkan^g the army was reorganized; many commanders had fled and men escaped; Chen Hao was made regiment commander, later betrayed. But many (Lo Yun-hum, Political Comm 1st Army Corps, Yang ~~Li-san~~ now in R. Head. remained. Jung-huan

One regiment was formed from the Anyang miners; second organized from the P'ing Hsiang & Lu Yang peasant guaras (then widespread in Hunan - these organized by Mao) third, one part of the garrison in Whhan which revolted against Wang Ching-wei.

Because the program of the autumn uprising was not sanctioned by the C.C., because we also had some severe losses, the C.C. decided the leadership was no good, I was dismissed (in 1928) from the party political bureau and also from the front party committee. There were many deserters; I found myself commander of the division. The provincial committee was criticized the movement, which it called refle movement. From the winder of (November) 1927 to autumn of 1928 we were in Ching Kang Shan. In November, 1927 we set up the first soviet in Tsalin (Kiangi, on the Hunan border) & elected the first soviet government. It's chairman was Tai Tsung-ling. We advanced a democratic program. At that time

Wang Tso & Yuan Wen-tsi, bandits of Chingkan^ghan, were taken in & increased Red A by 2 regiments to t total of 3 regiments. Mao was made commander.

there were many putschists who wanted to burn and kill more in many districts. We did not follow such a policy; we were therefore criticized by them as reformists. They wanted more burnings, killings, seizures, and attacked me for not carrying out a more radical policy. In May, 1928 I met Comrade Chu Teh and thenceforth we were always together. With part of the troops from the Nanchang Uprising we had advanced into Southern Hunan & there took ChingKangshan. From May 1928 to January 1929 is the ChingKangshan. Our plan was to establish a li-hsien Soviet area. We fought against two tendencies; first, to advance to Changsha, which we considered adventurousism; second to retreat to the border of Kwantung which was considered by us as escape from enemy. We regarded our first task to distribute land, secondly to set up a soviet government. We were for arming the people, free trade, good treatment of white troops & leniency in general. In the autumn of 1928 we held a representative meeting of different district of party near ChingKunshan. At that meeting a resolution was passed declaring that the Soviet Government would be victorious - because even there were some people who opposed our policy, believed we could not last long. In the winter of 1928 we received the new resolutions of the party & we agreed with the program. From that time on we were in complete agreement with the line of the party.

Resolutions of the 6th Congress summarized the experience of the 1925-27 revolution, the Nanchang Uprisings, the Canton Uprising & the autumn ~~Uprising~~ in Hunan. During the "struggle against adventurism" period we defeated two attempts to retake ChingKangshan. After our meeting with Chu Teh we organized the 4th Army with Chu Teh as commander & Mao as political commissar.

In the autumn of 1928 more troops come out to join the Reds from the armies of Ho Chien. They became the 5th Red Army. Among them were Peng Teh-huai, Teng P'ing (staff of 3rd Corps), killed in ~~Tsuny~~ Huang Kuo-nu T'en Teh-yuan. In the winter of 1927 there had been uprisings in Hunan Western & Eastern parts, Hupeh & (the west became Ho Lung; the East became Hsu Hsiang) provinces & they formed their own forces, thus originated Hsu Hsiang-chien & Chang Kuo-tao & those Soviets. In the Western part of Hupeh & Homan, in the winter of 1927., another partisan army arose, led by Ho Lieng, now leader of the 2nd Army.

Fang Chih-meng, Hsiao Shih-ping had also begun a movement along the Northeastern part of Kiangsi in the winter of 1927. One part of the Red Army was led out of Canton after the Uprising, by Peng Pai, and began the soviet in Hailofeng. Following a policy of putschism, they were soon wiped out by the enemy. One part of army, led by Ku Ta-chen left Hailfeng & became the 11th army. In the spring of 1928, near Tung Ku, Ksing Ku (Kiangsi) there were also partisan movements, led by Li Wen, Li Sao-chu, especially around Kian; later became the 3rd Army & the district the base of the Central Soviet Area. In the Spring of 1929 the districts of Western Fukien sprung up under Chang King-chen, Teng Tzu-hui & Hu Pui-tseh (afterward a social Democrat). This was basis of West Fukien Soviet Area.

(Education in Marxism:) When I went to Peiping the second time I was much influenced by the Russian revolution. I had read a great deal about it. Next I went to Shanghai & there talked over much of what I had read with Chen Tu-hsiu. He strongly influenced me. Three books I read, "Communist Manifesto." translated by Chen Wang-tao (the first Marxist book translated), "Class Struggle," by Kaatsky "History of Socialism," Kirkupps, and these turned my mind definitely toward communism.

In the summer of 1920 I found myself convinced of Marxist theories, and decided to be a socialist. In 1920 I married Liang K'ai-hui, daughter of my former teacher of ethics, whom I had met in Peiping.

In the winter of 1928 Peng Teh-huai, with part of the Army, joined us at ChingKangshan. The victory at ChingKangshan was influenced by the United Front with two bandit chiefs, who entered the Red Army against regimental commanders; Wang Tsu- & Yuan Wei-tsai. Later they were killed by masses of ChingKangshan (1930) who revolted against Red Army. The 3rd Campaign was not defeated, but its front broken up. Conditions in ChingKangshan were very bad. "Down with ~~the~~ Capitalism. "at squash,

as soldiers said to whom capitalism means landlords. In January 1929 Chu & Mao together broke through the white lines & established Soviets in other regions. Thus ended the period of Chingkarshan. Chingkarshan (?) not a place or village, but the name of a mt. locally known otherwise. There were five main villages on the mt., which had a circuit of 500 li & was 80 li across. CKS locally known as Ta Hsiao Wu Ching (great & small Five wells - ta, hsiao, chung, shang, hsia).

In January, 1929, we evacuated Chingkarshan & were followed by Chu Pei-teh & Kiantung & Fukien militarists. We succeeded in establishing soviet regions in Yungting, Shanghong, Lung Yeh. Our success was due to uniting with the mass movement. Our influence extended into other hsien but we did not yet set up the revolutionary power.

Conditions in the R.A. were becoming better & better. There were numerous struggles vs. bad tendencies in the R.A. For example, "partisanism" was a weakness; lack of discipline, exaggerated democracy, loose organization, failure to observe & obey orders. Another; "vagabondism", dislike to settle down to serious tasks of government, love of movement & "chasing chickens." Another: remnants of militarism, with officers dominating & beating men, discriminations in treatment, etc. With conquest of these tendencies the R.A. was strengthened. In Ku-t'ien Fukien we called the 9th party conference of the 4th Red Army in December, 1929, exchanged ideas & plans, removed many misunderstandings & laid the foundations for a high type of ideological leadership in the Red Army. Before this conference the tendencies in the R.A. described above were very serious & they were utilized by the counter-revolutionary Trotskyists. Some of them had gone into the R. A. to undermine it; they were discovered & a vigorous struggle was begun against them. Trotskyists were deprived of their offices Liu Ai-kung. The Trotskyists intended to destroy the army, did not believe in its role, wanted (typical - killed in battle) to lead it into difficult positions in battles vs. the enemy. After several unsuccessful battles their plans became quite evident. They also attacked my program & everything we advocated. Their winter-revolutionary force was overcome & after the Fukien conference they were discredited & their influence ended.

The conference prepared the way for the establishment of the Soviet power in Kiangsi. Next year (1930) was a year of great success. Almost all the southern half of Kiangsi was brought under Soviet control. Below Yungfeng, Lo An, Kuang Ching, Ti Sui, hsien, practically all S. Kiangsi was brought under soviet control. This became our base in southern Kiangsi. Our attention was then concentrated all the works of the local soviets. We had a struggle then with the opportunists, who were opposed to distribution of land. Their objections & opposition were overcome, & the peasants enthusiasm answered with support for our movement which helped us to face & defeat the KMT armies. Here was held an important party conference (local and representatives of the R.A.) on the 7th of February to decide upon the political line of the party, and here the land distribution was argued and decision reached to continue distribution & to establish K. prov. sov. gov.

Gradually the Red Army was becoming trained to work with the masses. At Chingkarshan the Red Army ~~army~~ had three disciplines. 1) commanders must be obeyed; 2) nothing must be taken from the poor; 3) all confiscated goods must be delivered to the government, for state use. After 1929 the R.A. began to work more closely to the peasants. Eight more points were added. 1) put up doors when you leave a house; 2) Return & roll up the straw on which you have slept; 3) Borrowed articles must be returned; 4) be kind & polite to the people; 5) Damaged borrowed articles must be replaced; 6) Transactions must be honest; 7) Defecate with care. Lin P'iao added last two 8) Don't search captured white soldiers. The RA men were taught to agitate & organize the people, 2) to arm the masses and 3) to raise money to support the war vs. the KMT.

In the first half year of 1930 there were several groups of partisan guards led by Li Wan-ling to Li Sa-chu. They were organized

into the Third Army, commanded by C. Wang Ku~~ng~~-lu, polit. commissar Chun Yi, Part of Chu Pei-teh's Min tuan was led by Lo P'ing-hui, who was dissatisfied with KMT, and went over to Communists during 1st half of 1930. The Fukien Red Guards & one part of Red Army were organized into 12th Army under Wu Chu~~ng~~-hao. political commissar T'ai Tsung-ling. Wu was later killed in battle & replaced by Lo P'ing-hui. At this time the 1st Army Corps was formed from the 3rd Army (Wang Kien-Lun), the 4th Army (Lin P(iao) the 12th Army (Lo P'ing Hui) and the corps commander was Chu Teh. Mao was political commissar. Party leadership was under a Front Committee of which Mao was chairman. Many local & independent regiments & divisions existed also, apart from the 1st Army Corps. In the 1st Army Corps at that time were more than 10,000 men.- which we called 10 divisions.

(a)

On tactics; In the Chingkanshan period had four slogans; 1) When enemy advances we retreat; 2) When the enemy settles down, we trouble them, 3) When the enemy avoids a battle, we attack; 4) When the enemy retreats we pursue. At first many were opposed to these six words, but later after much experience these rules were in general vindicated. We had numerically smaller force, limited resources & were forced to adopt tactics of guerilla warfare. The most important method we adopted was to concentrate (exceeded by 10 or 20 time by enemy) the army while replusing the enemy, to divide & separate the army when not fighting. This was contrary to the opinion of many experienced generals; yet had we not adopted them we could not have held & increased our positions.

In expanding Soviet area in general, the tactics of the Red Army were 1) for the wave-like development; 2) against development by "leaps and jumps" without proper consolidation. This kind of tactical line was developed as the result of many years of experience in political & military tactics. Such tactics were severely criticized by Li Li-san, who described them as the "new right opportunist tendency", & favored development by "leaps." They advocated concentration of all rifles in the hands of the R.A., and absorption of all partisan groups. They wanted to attack but not consolidate; to advance but not to secure the rear. Li Li-san therefore ordered the withdrawal of the R.A. from the rural districts & an attack on the big cities. His line was not yet defeated & part of it was accepted & carried out. The R.A. rejected the proposal to absorb the partisan & semi-partisan groups. We moved to carry out the advance on Nanchang & Changsha.

In the autumn of 1930 the R.A. moved into northern Kiangsi, attacked & captured many cities. When within striking distance of Nanchang the 1st Corps turned sharply west & moved on Changsha. In this drive we met & joined forces with the 3rd Corps of Peng Teh-huai, for the first time since 1929 when we had left him at Chingkanshan.

(There were three reasons for our victory over the January 1931 extermination campaign. 1) the consolidation of the 1st & 3rd Corps. 2) the change of the Li Li-san line 3) We overcame the anti-bolshevik counter-revolutionaries within our own ranks in R.A. & local district.

In March, 1920, Peng Teh-huai had been forced to leave Chingkanshan & descend to the southern part of Kiangsi. In April 1930 he reconnected with Chu Teh & Mao at Suichin. It was decided that the 1st Corps would operate in Fukien & Peng Teh-huai's 3rd Corps would operate between the Hunan Kiangsi border in the south. Peng's army had rapidly increased to a total of over 16,000 by June 1930 when began the movement on Changsha. In August the 3rd & 1st Corps combined & the 1st Front Army was formed. (Chu Teh was commander-in-chief of the 1st Front Army & Mao pol. commissar; also of the 1st Corps. At that time the Chinese workers & peasants revolutionary committee & C. Mao was elected Chairman.)

In September the second attack was made on Changsha under above leadership. Outside the city two brigades of enemy troops were eliminated but the attack failed. A serious struggle began between Li Li-san & the rev. committee. Li advocated an attack on Wuhan. In Li's opinion the revolution was near success & would soon have power over the whole

country. In our opinion the enemy was preparing for a heavy campaign against us. (Feng Yu-hsiang & Chiang Kai-shek were then fighting in the north & the outlook seemed extremely favorable to Li Li-san.) Especially after the occupation of Kian, in October, the erroneous line of Li Li-san was overcome.

The main tasks of the R.A. at that time were the strengthening of the R.A., the expansion & consolidation of organization & the gradual growth of sovietized areas. The attack on Changsha was not necessary, from this point of view. If it is considered a temporary action rather than an attempt to set up state power it was a good action for its effect on the national revolutionary movement was very great. The mistake was to attempt to hold Changsha & make a base of it; our power was not consolidated behind it. (Mao's wife, sister, the wives of Mao Tse-min^g & Mao Tze tan, and Mao's son, were all arrested by Ho Chien in M's native village & sent to Changsha. His wife & younger sister were killed, his two brothers & son later released.)

After overcoming Li-Li-san's line the Red Army was greatly strengthened. In this consolidation Comrade Peng played a big role. Some comrades in the Third Corps did not want to work with the First Corps & wanted to split the R.A. into two parts. Ci Peng overcame this tendency & achieved the consolidation. The anti-bolshevik groups led the 20th Army to revolt & attacked Red leader Liu Ti Tsao, commander of the 20th Army, was arrested; arrested the chairman of the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet; arrested others; attacked Mao Tse-tung on the basis of the Li Li-san line. This occurred at Fu Tien & is known as the Fukien Incident. (Fu Tien is near Kian). This anti-bolshevik movement was suppressed, due to the loyalty of the R.A. to Soviet methods & institutions & the support of the peasantry.

The First Campaign's strategy against it. In general our plan was to retreat & draw in the enemy, then return to outflank them. We were being encircled, from all sides, but we treated each column as if it were operating alone. Letting it into Soviet territory we achieved the position of maneuver in which we could, momentarily, encircle them, thus reversing the general strategical advantage enjoyed by a greatly superior enemy. Thus we sought to deal with each rout army separately. Had we not followed such a strategical line we could not have won our victories. The C.I.C. of the enemy was Lui Teh-ping, & we were attacked by five routes, with a total of 100,000 men vs. our force of 40,000. We attacked the center columns on strategical moves such as those indicated above. In January 1931, the First Extermination campaign was destroyed.

In May, 1931, we met & defeated 200,000 men commanded by Ho Ying-chin^g in the 2nd Extermination Campaign, whose forces numbered 200,000 men. The situation was then thought to be very critical. Our area was small & our troops concentrated vs the 2nd route of the enemy's advance. They moved in by 7 routes. We broke up the 2nd route & then quickly eliminated the 3rd Route. The 4th Route retreated & the 5th Route was partly destroyed. The 6th & 7th Routes were then easily eliminated. Within 14 days we fought six battles & marched 8 days, to bring an end to that campaign. The First Route Army under Tsai Fing-Kai & Chang Kuan-nai then withdrew without any serious struggle.

One month later began the 3rd Campaign, lasting from July to September, with Chiang Kai-shek personally commanding the campaign. 300,000 men were involved. There were three main routes; Chen Ming-hsu, Ho Ying-chin^g, and Chu Shao-liang (now in Lanchow). Chiang Kai-shek adopted the tactics of rapid penetration, moving his armies 80 li per day & rapidly occupying important soviet territory. Tsai & Chen Ming-hsu were on the left column. Chiang hoped to take us by storm. Our total force numbered only about 30,000, and we had to be extremely careful how our men were deployed. In five battles we eliminated 5 columns of enemy troops. The same tactics were adopted as previously, each column being cut off & eliminated separately. In the 3rd campaign Comrade Wang Kung-liao (commander of the 3rd army) was sacrificed.

"Sovietize the territory, expand the R. army (and rest it), and raise new funds." were the three tasks of the R.A. after conclusion of the Third Campaign.

In 1931, when Japan began to occupy Manchuria, the First Soviet Congress was called in December & the first Soviet Ch. Government was established. In Dec. of this year there was an uprising of the 28th Route Army of Sun Li-chen, and led by Comrade Teng Ch'ing-fou. The 26th (?) Army in part joined the Red Army at Ningtu & was reorganized into the 5th Corps. (Shih commander of 8th Army). In 1932 we fought a big battle & occupied Chuangchow. We fought Chiang Kai-shek at (does not follow on next page) Fought Chen C.T. at Nansheng. Fought Chiang Kai-shek, I-Hang, Lo-an, Lichuan, Chien Ning, T'an Ning. Battles near Kanchow but it was not occupied by us. From Oct. 1932 to Jan 1935 I left military work, I devoted my time to Soviet work.

In Feb. 1933 the Fourth Campaign of Nanking's troops was defeated by the Red Army. From the winter of 1933 began the Fifth Campaign. Chiang Kai-shek mobilized nearly 1,000,000 troops to occupy the Soviet areas & utilized the fortification system to attack us.

In that period we made two important errors. One was the failure to unify really with Tsai Ting-Kai's army. The other was the adoption of erroneous strategy of simple defence, throwing away the former methods of meeting the enemy.

The Soviet Government in Feb. 1932 had declared war on Japan. Early in 1933 it announced that it would welcome the cooperation of all armies in war vs. Japan on these conditions; 1) cessation of attack on the Soviet area & the Red Army, 2) to guarantee democratic civil liberties, 3) to arm the people for anti-Japanese war.

Although in the 5th Campaign our victories were not decisive, as in previous campaigns, our operations caused enormous losses to the forces of the counter-revolution. Vigorous battles were fought & we acquired much experience in Soviet organization. In January, 1934 the 2nd All-Chinese Congress of Soviets convened in Suichien & a survey of soviet work took place. Here Mao gave his report summarizing the work of the Soviets. In October, 1934, began the famous Westward March. In January, 1935 we reached Tsunyi in Kweichow. From January of 1935 to May, 1935 the most active combat & the most energetic fighting was taking place. Through many difficulties through Kweichow(?), Yunnan, Szechuan, across rivers, & mountains, avoiding & fighting & defeating enemy armies in pursuit, we reached Shensi at last in October, 1935. In this period, in order to lead the 4th Corps, C. Chu Teh remained in Szechuan with the 4th Front Army Corps. Peng Teh-huai & myself led the 1st. The victory of the Red Army & the long march was due first to the leadership of the Communist Party & secondly to the great determination, skill & rev. ardor of the leading cadres. Personal leadership is only significant as an expression of the strength, Solidarity & will of the party as a whole (crossed out sentence) The Chinese C.P. Party was, is and will be faithful to Marx Leninism & will continue its struggle vs. every opportunist tendency. I have always carried out the policy of the party vs. opportunist tendencies. Comrades Chu Teh, Chang Kuo-tao, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Wang Ming, Lo Fu, Chou En-lai, Po.Ku, Wang Chia-shan, Peng Teh-huai, Lo Man, Feng Fu, Lin Piao, Hang In, Hsu Haitung, Ching Yung, Chen Chang Hao, Hsiuo Teh and many many excellent comrades, many who gave their lives to the revolution, working together toward a single purpose, have made the Red Army & the Soviet movement and these and thousands of others ready to replace them will lead it to the final victory.

(Following was crossed out) I am not a learned man & whenever I have time I try to increase my knowledge by reading. If one does not learn ~~xxx~~ his work cannot improve or advance. In August, 1935 the Party declared to the whole country for United Front ~~xxxxxx~~ against Japanese imperialism. In February 1936 the Workers-Peasants Red Army was re-organized into the Peoples Red Army & became the vanguard anti-Japanese army. We crossed the Huang He ~~Jxxxxxx~~ and entering Shansi attempted to engage the Japanese directly. Our army fought for 3 months in Shansi & won certain victories. The masses everywhere enthusiastically welcomed us & many joined the Red Army. In order to obstruct us Chiang Kai-shek mobilized more than 10 divisions vs. us & erected extensive fortifications. We were forced to withdraw to Kiangsi & adopt new measures for bringing about the

movement for national liberation.

Now the C.P. has announced many new policies in an effort to unite the people in their struggle vs. Japanese imperialism. We stand wholeheartedly behind these policies & believe that if they are properly & completely realized we will win the support of many peoples. If the Chinese people are united in their efforts then the national liberation as well as social liberation of China will be assured. The Fourth Corps, under the leadership of Chu Teh & Chiang, & the 2nd Corps, under Ho Lung & Jen Pi-shih are advancing to north China to concentrate their forces & combine with us. When this concentration has been realized we will have a much greater force to begin the struggle vs. Japan. The victory of the anti-Japanese national salvation war is not distant but near. (End of crossed out part.)

Now we are endeavoring to form a united front, against Japanese imperialism with other parties, groups, professional circles, and armies. In order to fight Japan and form a thorough democratic system in China. This will be by object and work that of the Party & the R.A. hereafter.

The Long March by Mao Tse-tung . Oct. 11th

The long march was undertaken to change the conditions of the Red Army & the Soviet movement, to create a new basis for its operations, & direction taken was toward the point of future Japanese aggression. Conditions in Kiangsi were not favorable for continued stay there. It was a big strategical move & there were bound to be many difficulties that could not be foreseen.

The Long March (Ch'ang Cheng) was led by the C. P. Central Committee & it had the support of the Red Army & the people of the Soviet Districts. The story can be divided into six stages: 1) From Kiangsi to Hsiang Kiang 2) From Hsiang Kiang to Ts'un Yi, in Kweichow 3) From Sun Yi (Tsun Yi) to the border of Yunnan, and the return to Tsun Yi; 4) From Tsun Yi to Chin Shia Chiang over Szechuan Yunnan border; 5) From Cin Shia Chiang to Mao Erh Kai 6) From Mao Erh Kai to Shensi.

The Long March covered more than 20,000 li.

Leaving Ta Tu on Oct. 16, 1934, and ended in October 20, 1935 at Wu Chi Ch'en.

The first period ended in early December 1934, when we reached the Upper Hsiang Kiang River, in Chuang Hsien City and entered the motor highway there on the border of Kiangsi & Hunan. From Dec. 1 to Jan 9 we marched to Tsun Yi, on the Second Stage. The Third Stage lasted from the 9th of Jan. to March 28, when R.A. marched to west Kweichow & entered southern Szechuan, then turned south toward Yunnan & finally back again to Tsun Yi. From March 28th to May 10th the R.A. crossed Chin Shia Chiang to Hui Li. The Fifth Stage was completed on July 20th when we reached Mao Erh Kai, in Szechuan. The sixth was completed in Shensi.

During the first stage the main enemies opposing the R.A. were the Liang Kuang armies. Chiang Kai-shek & the Liang-Kuang troops were not at first prepared. Our first big campaign was directed vs. the Southwest. Reached Nankiang, on the order of Kuangtung, after several successful battles. The second campaign fought at Kueitung, Jen Hua, on the border of Kuangtung, Kiangsi & Hunan. Our main enemy there were the Hunan troops. Lin Uw, Lan Shan, Kang Hua, Yung Ming, Tao Chou & (Kuang Yuang & Ch'uan Chou) in Hunan & Kuangsi borders, were the scene of the 3rd campaign. Here the R.A. faced the Kuangtung troops (following the R.A.), in Hunanese & Nanking troops in the north, and Li Tsung-jen & pai ihung-hsi in the south. ~~xxxxxx~~ Yunnan & finally back again to Tsun Yi. ~~xxxxxx~~ From May 10th ~~xxxxxx~~ to May 10th ~~xxxxxx~~ Chin Shia Chiang to Hui Li. The Fifth Stage was completed ~~xxxxxx~~ on July 20th when we reached Mao Erh Kai, in Szechuan.

More than 10 battles were fought in this campaign & we succeeded again in breaking thru their enemy lines. In the first three campaigns enemy troops were hastily mobilized in Kuangsi & more than 30 regiments of Chiang's troops were dispatched to the south of Hunan. Chiang mobilized more than

30 regiments from Kiangsi front; Hunan mob more than 30; Kuangsi & Kuangtung mobilized more than 40 regiments, so together had more than 100 regiments chasing us.

Chiang Kai-shek mobilized his troops to operate through Kian (in Kiangsi) and thence to Chengchow & Chuangchow ~~in~~ in Hunan.

By this time our feet were weary, but no wearier than Chiang Kai-shek's troops. (9)

The Kuangtung troops after a few weeks gave up pursuit of us, but Kweichow troops were added on our front. We fought over 10 battles before occupying Tsun Yi. Mao walked most of the way; when he was ill rode in chair or on horseback.

In the third period we wanted to go directly across the Yangtze into Szechuan, but Lin Hsiang had already taken up strong positions along the Yangtze. In Yunnan troops had also been mobilized. Kuangsi troops had dropped off & Hunan troops had dropped off in Eastern Kweichow, but Chiang's sore-footed troops continued the march, losing about 1/2 their number in battles & by desertions. Our main enemies were Kweichow, Szechuan & Yunnan troops. When we reached Shasi in Wei Hsien, the conditions were not favorable to cross the Yangtze, (in extreme n.e. corner of Yunnan) so we returned to Tsun Yi and recaptured it. Chiang's troops had been reinforced there, but we defeated them & the Kweichow troops with them. We crossed and recrossed the Chu Shui Ho (Red River) in this maneuver. Wang Chia-lieh, civil & military governor of Kweichow, had one airplane & used it against us, together with Chiang's planes & Kuangsi's. Their planes bombed & observed our movements. (W)

In the Fourth Period, from Kweichow to Szechuan, our enemy was Chiang Kai-shek & Szechuan, Kweichow & Yunnan local troops. It was the most complex & violent period & most difficult & our zigzag path was cut out by more than 10 battles. On our first attempt to cross the Yangtze we failed. Then we wanted to go through Yunnan to the Upper Yangtze and cross into western Szechuan. (9)

From Tsun Yi we went across the Chu Shui for the third time. Chiang Kai-shek and Szechuan troops were mobilized in Szechuan to oppose the R.A. which they expected to cross the Yangtze. But R.A. turned quickly toward Tsun Yi and CKS mobilized troops there to defend the city. But again R.A. turned to the south directly toward Kweichow's capital, ~~Wei Kuaiyang~~ and came within 20 li of it. CKS was then in Kweiyang & was very worried. He ordered his troops to move 150 li per day to pursue us. CKS ordered his troops to move parallel with us in the march through Yunnan. R.A. crossed within 30 li of Yunnanfu. Despite being surrounded & pursued by overwhelming numbers, the R.A. maneuvered through this difficult position by false starts to deceive enemy, and sudden reversals and turns in unexpected directions. In these experiences the enemy discovered that in order to destroy R.A. & halt its march it must make successful flank attacks. The R.A. could not be stopped by encirclement, pursuit or air bombardment, therefore the enemy hurriedly threw up defenses in our route of march, & attempted to halt us by 1) occupying points on our line of march & obstructing us, and 2) attempting flank attacks. Yunnan troops & CKS troops followed R.A. in parallel lines, attempting to outdistance them to strategic points, but failed to do so. They ordered all boats burned on the ~~Chin Shia Chiang~~ but RA crossed at Chia Ping Tu.

The Fifth Stage, beginning after crossing Chin Shia Chiang: RA failed to capture Huili, and went on to Ta Liang Mts and then across the Ta Tu Ho. Then through Chung nai (?) range, to border of Kansu & Szechuan, at Mao Erh Kai. RA's enemies at this time were Szechuan & Nanking troops. Yunnan & Kweichow troops had given up the pursuit, & Szechuan troops were trying to obstruct us while Nanking troops were pursuing us.

→ Chin Shia Chiang (Gold Sand River)

In this period the difficulties of RA were very great. We were among people whose language we could not speak & who opposed us. We were in extremely hard country for travel.

In the Sixth Period our main enemy troops were Chang Hsueh-liang's Tungpei Army, Hu Tsung-nan's Nanking troops, & the local troops of Shensi's Kansu. This was the most difficult & dangerous period. CKA troops tried to obstruct us on the Kansu-Szechuan border at Pao Chou & from there we went northward, out of Man Tze district, into Kansu. In the whole period in Szechuan we went along the ManTzu district, through high mountains, through the Grasslands, and in country where there were no houses & no people. From Mao Erh Kai to Pao Chou & Pao Chou to La Tzu Kou, from La Tzu Kou to Wei Shui, from Wei Shui to the Lanchow-sian Highway & from there to Wu Chi Chen, the RA (1st Army Corps) finally ended its long march in Shenpee, fighting numerous skirmishes & a few major battles on the way. S

The fourth & fifth periods, in Mao's opinion, were the most interesting. In the Yu Period, when enemy operations were under direct command of CKS, RA was also most active. The great rivers, the snow mts. the Tibetan people, the tribes people, the grasslands, were all interesting experiences.

When the RA left Kiangsi & broke through the Kuang-tung troops blockade he was very worried & began to mobilize all his forces vs. us. We made a compromise with him, that his troops would not obstruct the RA & that we would not occupy Nan Hsiung. CKS cursed Chen Chi-tang for this, for "letting free the tiger from the mts." Chen replied that he had the whole country's army at his disposal & could not stop the RA, how could Kuantung's troops do so? He satisfied himself with sending troops after us, but did not really take any strong offensive vs. us. This agreement was made through captured Kuantung officers, who were released & returned to Chen Chi-tang with this message. He gave his reply in a similar manner. (?)

When leaving Kiangsi the RA travelled at night only & no torches could be used. In Mao's column torches were prohibited & many people fell off their horses. Other columns lighted torches, however & the sight was very beautiful - a long dragon winding through the mountains. Mao remembers this sight especially on the border of Kiangsi, Hunan, at a Jen Cheng (formerly called Kweiyang.)

u On the Kwangsi-Hunan border Li Tsung-jen & Pai Chung-hsi adopted the policy of lending us a road, for they feared if we had no entry to Hunan we would flow into Kuangsi. Chiang wanted them to build a wall of men on the northwest bank of the Hsiang Kiang River & halt us, but Li & Pai did not do so, fearing that the RA might be forced to move southward into Kiangsi. u

When not in contact with R.A. CKS's troops seemed to be very courageous. They marched quickly & kept up with our long difficult marches. ~~They~~ But when they came near us they were extremely careful. They had been used to fighting with fortifications behind them, now they had none. In the long march four methods were used by CKS; frontal attack, flank attack, encirclement and obstruction. We overcame him by using tactics opposite to us. When we wanted to go to south Kweichow we made a feint to the west, when we wanted to enter Szechuan, we went to Yunnan. In this was we exhausted & tantalized Chiang's army, and in the battles that occurred won victory.

The Yunnan-Kweichow period was militarily most interesting and critical. It was also a critical period for CKS. He led a strenuous life then, flying from Chungking to Kweiyang when we were operating there & to Kun Ming when we moved there. Chiang especially struggled to stop us at the H. Chin Hsia Chiang. He telegraphed to Lung Yan, to Lui Hsiang, to his own generals, "The fate of the party & the nation depends on this." Hsi Yu was in command of CKS's troops at this time. They were very weary & wanted a rest. Chiang replied "Atleast you must fight one

successful battle before earning a rest." The initiative rested always with the Red Army & by skillful use of it RA kept Chiang's troops always chasing, never permitted them to take up a position, fortify it & block the various possible routes of advance.

During the Long Pursuit CKS did not win a single important victory against the Red Army. This annoyed him very much, especially in Szechuan, where the Szechuan troops were laughing at Chiang's men because they had not won any battles. In Szechuan he reminded Yang Sen that Shu Ton Kai (of Paiping) had been wiped out at Ta Tu Ho. The RA met an old man who had witnessed the battle of Ta Tu Ho & he explained that Sha Ton Kai was eliminated because he had stopped there for 3 days to celebrate the birth of a "prince", his son; Had he not done so he wouldn't have been defeated, for the Ch'ing troops were thus given time to mobilize & attack him from both banks of the river. CKS ordered Yang Sin to repeat the victory of the Manchus, but Yang's troops on contrary were badly defeated by Reds. Chiang's troops however, did not win absolutely nothing. They got the straw sandals left on the road by the RA, and RA had a song then with a last line saying, "We give you our sandals south of the Chin Hsia Chiang." Sh

More than 20 regiments of Chiang's troops were waiting for the Reds in the Man Tzu Grasslands, but RA broke through them, destroying three regiments. In the pursuit of RA through this country about 1/3 of Chiang's troops were lost because of freezing, starving, or exposure. Thus the capacity of endurance of Chiang's troops was shown to be not very high.

"So we can say that the Long March is a kind of Manifesto. He himself commanded the resistance & the campaign vs. us. & used every means of modern military technique & all the ingenuity he & his staff (including foreign advisors - s.s.) possessed, but he failed to destroy us. This proves his inadequacy & the incapability of the whole militarist organization to eliminate the RA., even under the worst conditions for us. The last chapter of this manifesto was written in Shansi campaign. Chiang had already announced that the RA was destroyed, was no longer capable of offensives, yet when we went into Shansi we moved in steadily & Chiang was obliged to send 10 divisions against us. If the RA is dead, why did Chiang send 10 divisions vs. us? This is the final demonstration of Chiang's failure to stop or eliminate us and proves with finality the final success of our Long March to the north.

Propaganda value of the Long March very great. Formerly many peasants in Szechuan, Yunnan, Kweichow did not know what the RA was, or what it stood for. Today they know, they have seen it & heard & read of its program & no amount of anti-Red propaganda can deceive them. The seeds of future mass action have been sown by the RA on its route of 20,000 li & a harvest will one day be reaped as a result of it.

It is quite true, as some writers have pointed out, that in pursuing the RA through Kweichow, Yunnan & Szechuan CKS increased his power all through there.

Li Pei wrote a poem about this district in west Szechuan & passing through the mts, saying that "The mountains rise up right in front of one's face, and "the clouds rise from the horse's head," Mao remembered this poem & felt like Li Pei. Another range of mts. passed was the Lu Shan Kuan, often described as a very terrible place. In reality not so bad. RA fought & won two battles there. Wu Meng Mts are another range on the Kweichow-Yunnan border. Between Ta Tu Ho & Chin Hsia Kiang there is a range described by geographers as very high. Actually its flat country. The Sixth Range passed was the Ta Hsueh (Great Snow) on the west banks of the Ta Tu Ho, & after crossing the Liu Ting Chiao they crossed a mt. called the Ta Hsueh Shan & looked afar to the great ranges of snow mts. Ch'ang Ch'ien tells in this "Western Travels" of crossing the mt which is an amusing fairy tale. The last mountain ranged covered was the Min Kiang. Before reaching Min Chiang RA took Hua Lun P'ing Mt. from Lui Wen-hui. Trail was very narrow; one squad could have held the pass. The 2nd mt. was Pao Tung Kang Shan & it was peculiar, had no road, nobody had passed over for 20 years. We had to make our own road, by cutting down bamboo and the mud was waist deep. There was not Ch

a dry spot on the mt. & about 2/3 of animals of one corps had to be left behind; many fell down the side or were left in the mts. The third mt. Chia Chin Shan of the Chung Nai (Lai?) range was the highest we had passed. People told us we had to breathe & move slowly for density very light. Were told must cross before 3 p.m. or we would run into ice & snow. This advice was correct & we saw, for the first time, many dead of our own people on the rd. Many died on the mts, resistance lessened. After crossing this mt. we met the 4th Army Corps, from which we had been separated when 9th Corps had gone into Northwest Szechuan. The fifth mt. of the same range was called "Meng Pi", the "Dream Pen" mt. & many died in crossing that also. Another mt. near Mao Erh Kai called Ta Ka (Big Drum) was beautiful to see, with many "white dragons" - snow on the mountainside cut by dark rivers. The central range of the Kuen Lun, the divide between the Huang Ho & Chin Shia Chiang, the range called Ming Chu, was next passed. Its very long & spread to south Shansi Honan & western Kwangsu. We crossed the headwaters of the Min Chiang, a big river in Szechuan. We controlled the waters & the ranges of all China! The Eighth Range crossed was in southern Kansu near Mien Hsien. The 9th Range was Lo P'an Shan, and here we met & defeated the cavalry of Chang Hsueh-liang, 7th Division. There were two platoons, white & black horse. The white horse commander rushed out when Reds encircled them & escaped, but black horse wavered & we captured many of them. Last one was Chiao Shan, in northern Shensi, on border of Kansu. Difficult to get water - even none for cooking. (Ch)

Rivers crossed: Kan Chiang, Hsiang Kiang, Wu Chiang, Chu Shui Rai Fang Chiang, Pu Tu, Chin Shia Chiang, Ta Tu Ho, Shao Chin Hsiang, Min Kiang, Wei Ho, Pai Lung Chiang (White Dragon River).

(Ch) In crossing the Wu Chiang, though not wide, the current is very swift. (It was passed in Kweichow & it empties into the Yangtze.) Enemy troops were on the opposite bank & RA men swam across, covered by RA fire. They constructed two bamboo bridges & by these the RA got over the Wu Kiang.

In crossing the Chu Shui Ho (Red Water River) the Red Army was told that it was a most dangerous journey, with only one iron chain bridge available for crossing. Red built boats & crossed.

The Pu Tu is also crossed by a chain bridge. This was captured by RA when they crossed, the enemy having failed to destroy it.

The most difficult crossing was the Chin Hsia Chiang which was deep, fast & wide. We had no adequate maps of it & we knew little about it. The White Army had attempted to destroy all the ships. So we sent several detachments toward Yunnanfu, to occupy cities around it. This decoyed the enemy. They feared we were going to Yunnanfu & sent troops there & to Tali. They feared we wouldn't cross Kin Hsia Chiang. Lu Pei-chen, chief of staff, led one regiment, went 150 li per day & reached Chin Hsia Kiang just in time. He captured Chia Ping ~~Ma~~ Tu. Ships had already been ordered burned. Lolos there had not yet carried out order. When we arrived the tu-su (Lolo chief) fled & we captured his treasurer. All ships were drawn up on the other side. At night we made the tu-ssu's cashier call for ships, and thus RA got possession of 4 of them. We went several leads of troops to other side & found Lung Yun's troops playing mah-jong. Their rifles were hanging on the wall & they were all captured without firing a shot. In these 4 ships the whole army crossed, under "Fleet Commander" Chen Yung. He was a skillful "admiral", treated the boatmen well & we all got over safely! This crossing is extremely difficult, and there is a 7 li drop to the river bank on the mt on the south & 3 li on the north. It is about 300 meters wide. Very deep, natives said when you dropped in nobody knew when you would come up. Air is very bad - stifling air. When we crossed the river we destroyed all the ships. Enemy could not cross, had to march 800 li to Chia Chou & cross there. This gave the RA a much needed rest. This year we read in the papers that there was an earth quake there, & Chin Shia Kiang was broken; Perhaps natives will have a legend that the RA was responsible. (Ch)

The Ta Tu Ho: The enemy was guarding both sides of the river. Liu Pei-chen was commanding one regiment & this regiment reached An Jen Ch'ang, the exact spot where Shu Tu K'ai (Taiping) was eliminated. Yang Sin's troops

(one battalion) were on the opposite bank. He is a native of An Jen Ch'ang and had returned with one ship to visit his wife there. We attacked suddenly and captured his ship. Under cover of fire we sent 12 men to south side of river, & these 12 men captured the enemy's position. Now boats were secured & one detachment was landed on opposite bank. Crossing very difficult, current swift, takes one hour for one ship to cross. Time was important, main force passed on to Lu Ting Chiao. Enemy at Lu Tiang Chiao already prepared to meet R.A. Brodge here very costly. 18 provinces had built it. Enemy had already taken up boards. One man climbed along the iron chains & led several others to attack enemy's position, throwing hand grenades at them. A special decree was issued to honor this man & the 12 of An Jen Ching. (Liu Pei-cheng was formerly a white army commander, from Szechuan, was very famous for his bravery, joined RA. Now with 4th Corps.

Relations of R.A. to people on the way: Reports from the south say that people said the RA, in its passing was not a "dreadful thing", what the people feared were the anti-red forces. The people had to worry about their children & wives when the White soldiers passed, but Reds did not bother either. When we reached northeastern Kweichow, in a place called Nu Ch'ang (Ox Market) some people came to see us & asked whether we had brought Mr. Soviet with us, they wanted to talk to him about saving China. (The R.A. had posted bills declaring that "only Soviet can save China." and they did not understand.)

(In 1930 Lu Hsing Pong, Fukien militarist, posted a bill offering a reward "for the capture & arrest of Soviet." This fellow had been doing a lot of damage everywhere, Lu announced & he wanted to capture him.)
 National minorities, like the Miaos, Yao, Lolos, etc, on the Kwantung-Kuangsi border, treated us very well. Two years before Pai Chung-hsi had been at war with them & they hated him. We gave them money & arms, & treated them well, & they liked the R.A. Many of them joined us. Several years before there was a Yao who regarded himself as emperor, & many people worshipped him. Because of this, Pai Chung-hsi forgot the Yao. When we reached the district this fellow sent representatives to us, we received them well, gave them rifles & helped them. (Emperor's slogan "Up with Yao, Down with Han!") The Yao district, near Chuangchou (Chan Chou?) there is much fruit, many tasty oranges & RA ate them by hundreds. One command proposed that as soon as Sov. Gov. established all over the country, the first decree must be to cultivate the Chuanchou orange everywhere in China. Till now we have not yet passed the decree.

On the Miao Ling Range in Kweichow there are more than 1,000,000 Miao living. They treated us well. Under the policy of national minorities we we did not confiscate the landlord yao, only the Nan. They liked us & made no opposition. They wear skirts and have a high headdress. In Tsun Yi we stayed for several days, called mass meetings, & Mao & Chou spoke. There were many students in attendance, besides the peasants. & Many ~~XXXXXX~~ Tsur Yi people wear white turbans. Why? In ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ the San Kuo Liu Pei was defeated by Sun Chuan & died in Szechuan. After his death people mourned for him & many still wear the white turban. Chiang Kai-shek has ordered this prohibited, because contrary to China custom of white for funerals, & as part of New Life Movement he prohibited it. Actually it increases their beauty. Many people in Kweichow (?), Szechuan & Yunan still wear white turbans.)

There are three peculiarities in these provinces: widespread opium in Kweichow, ham in Yunan, and rice mash in Szechuan. Rice mash is delicious, but 18 years-old women go trouserless, too poor to buy them. If Hitler wants to prohibit nudism, in China he would have to furnish them with trousers.

Relations of R.A. to people on the way: Reports from the south say that people said the R.A., in its passing was not a "dreadful thing," what the people feared were the anti-Red forces. The people had to worry about their children & wives when the White Soldiers passed, but Reds did not bother either. When we reached northeastern Kweichow, in a place called Nu Ch'ang (Ox Market) some people came to see us & asked whether we had

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Concerning the opium in Kweichow, the poppy fields, red, lavender & other colors, are very beautiful to see. In Kweichow there is a Ta Ti-fang, and a Pai-Teng, "Rotten Stool", and an ancient scholar wrote a couplet about them which goes like this.

"Great Place (has no great place) there is none.

"Rotten Stool (has a rotten stool) there is.

This couplet is written on the doors every where & represents ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ economic geographical features of the country. It is all mountainous, with no plains, even difficult to find a spot big enough for an airport. Very poor; every house has sotten stools, another couplet.

"In Heaven there is not a dry spot

"On earth not 3 feet of level land."

also tells of character of the country.

CKS can do nothing about the mts., but he can change the rotten stool, therefore must be responsible for it.

Yunnan ham is excellent, "probably best in world." People say this is because of the wind, which is peculiarly favorable for drying hams. We promise hams to those who join the Soviet United Front.

Once we confiscated 3,000 hams from one landlord, and there were enough for everyone in the column to have one ham. There were far too many. We gave away hams to the people - 6 or 7 catties each. This is an unique event in history of Chinese hams.

The people of Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechuan are extremely poor. Their life is much bitterer than in the southeast. They sympathized with the aims of the Red Army & many of them joined our ranks. We distributed confiscated goods among the people, especially national minorities, wherever we went.

The Man-tzu are divided into two groups; the Lolo, I*jin, live in Yunnan & S.W. Szechuan; the rest, to the north of Szechuan are Tibetan in origin. (?) Lolos treated us very well. At one place, Mien Ning, in S.E. Szechuan between Chia Chiang & Ta Tu Ho, Lui Po-cheng became a blood brother of a Lolo chief, by going through chicken ceremony, already described. Lui is 44 years old. His knowledge of Szechuan proved valuable.

The Lolos were very strong, climb mountains very swiftly, and whenever Chinese troops go through they defeat them. When we occupied Mien Ning the mayor & the many landlords & merchans fled into the Lolo district. The Lolos killed the mayor & took the women's clothes away & sent them back. We passed many of them on the road, wearing straw skirts & covering their breasts with their hands. After our agreement with the Lolos we had very good relations with them, & found them quite kind & likeable people. Some of them joined our army. Six Lolos are now in our party school.

Our worst relations were with the Tibetan tribes in western Szechuan. We had to have relations with them, we had to get food from them, but we could not speak their language. In one place, Hei Shui Ho (Black Water River) which flows into MinKiang, we had great difficulty. This district never conquered by China, has a queen of its own. When we arrived they all disappeared from the road & villages. 100 yards from the road it was dangerour travelling; they had in ambush with knives, rifles & spears. We had to raid the fields, could not buy food, for this they hated us. They dropped stones on us from heights & often killed men. A great stone dropped on a man a few feet from Mao & he was killed. When we cut harvests we decided that later on we would pay - have not yet paid. This is our foreign publication.

In the snow mountains, the Tsaoti & the Man-tru, all three conditions united to oppose us. But there was one good thing & that was ch'ing k'o - Tibetan green wheat. It was not bad to eat, not as good as wheat or rice, but still it tasted good to us. We distributed much of it among our troops, & everyone ground or ~~xxxxx~~ cooked his own. Many white moustaches were seen among the RA. Fish were plentiful, and they were good eating. Big turnips were also plentiful & enormous. One would feed 15 men. Beets also tasted good. On such things we equipped ourselves from the Man Tzu for the 15 days trip across the Tsao Ti. So the Man-tzu

fared pretty badly ~~in~~ at Red hands in west Szechuan & no doubt many went hungry for two winters 1935 & 1936 when the two RA passed through.

Horses were extremely important to us; housing, clothing, provisions, & riding (communication) were all accomplished by their help. Especially important to the women, about 30 who came all the way. Only one bound foot, Lo Ping-hui's wife. Rest mostly walked but used mule whenever tired. The women developed a theory that mule was more precious than husband; depended on them for the "Four Constructive Principles" of Sun Yat-sen.

Our greatest losses in Man Tzu resulted from the struggle with nature. Comparatively smaller was the struggle with the Man-tzu. No adequate shelter, no proper clothing, through rain & snow, no proper food, etc. acct for many deaths.

The Grasslands: We had been warned to prepare for this trip. We passed through on Aug. 18th, & on the sixth day reached Pai Yu, where we saw the first house, built from ox dung, which was used as a stable for their animals. It seemed a palace to us & many did not want to leave it, and several did not. No trees in the Grasslands. We had to sleep under shrubs, tied tops together & slept under them, but no protection vs. rain. Very cold at night. Drank cold water; no wood for fires. At first we could not pass through, did not know the road. Later captured a man who had been over & he led us through. The road, when we found it, was very wide, created by tribesmen who travel between Szechuan & Kansu. Many died in the grass lands. Very cold. Altogether not so dreadful as we supposed. Besides waterways, landways, & airways, we discovered our route of travel & that is Tou-f'u - bead curd road. That was the Grasslands. Not only we but also the 2nd & Fourth Corps passed the grasslands, but afterward they remained in Sikong. The 7th & 2nd Corps have now crossed the Grassland three times.

So ~~the~~ nature combined with CKS was unable to stop the RA & it completed its long march to the Northwest still intact.

Now the Three Army Corps are concentrated in the Northwest. They all went through the Long March & they are hardened for the anti-Japanese times ahead. In the L.M. we lost numerically in the R.A., but we preserved the fundamental fighting strength of R.A., & the fundamental cadres. Men lost on the march are seeds dropped along the way & a harvest will be drawn from them. The L.M. spread seeds through 10 provinces & when spring comes, they will grow & flourish to flower in revolution.

Ch The last difficulty of the march was at La Tsu k'ou, on the Upper part of Pai Lung Kiang, on border of Szechuan & Kansu. The crossing to the river was covered by a narrow pass. Enemy held bothsides of rock mts., & heavily fortified & machine-gunned. Mao & Lin Piao didn't sleep for a whole night. 2nd Division ordered to take the enemy positions. Had to climb up sheer perpendicular rock to a higher position & from there throw grenades on enemy position, guarding the bridges. They withdrew. Reds jumped down from their rock (many killed in the jump) & occupied the position. It was after crossing this bridge into Kansu that Reds saw first Lao Pai Hsung since entering Man Tzu country. Would have welcomed even a landlord by then, if he was Chinese, hadn't seen our people for so long.

Cavalry: We'd been told how fierce & terrible were the cavalry of the Mas, how invincible. But we had to fight with cavalry, otherwise we'd have to return to Kwanzsi. Chiang concentrated 6 divisions of cavalry to obstruct us. Along the way we prepared special drill for the cavalry. We had 3 battles with them & each was a victory. Not only they didn't capture us, we captured them & rode into the N.W. on their horses. There ~~was~~ formed the nucleus of present Red cavalry.

The long march successful first because of strong leadership of C.P. & Rev Gov., 2nd because of the strong cadres, the skeleton of the army, 3rd because of the courage & bravery of R.A. men, 4th, the sympathy & help of the people. Thus we came to N.W. with fundamental fighting capacity of R.A. unbroken & also our R.A. mixed valuable experience &

training in long march. Of course many arguments & differences of opinion on march, concerning direction & method of march, etc, but majority of cadres supported the march. Against the many opinions we struggled successfully & because of that we overcame many opinions & reached final goal.

The Long March is the Chinese "Iron Road" (book by Sera _____) It expresses the Iron will of the Chinese nation, especially the will of the masses of Chinese people. The R.A. reveals the long march reveals the unheard heroism of the Chinese history. Of course there are also cowards didn't want to resist foreign invasion, subjugation. If in the Chinese nation there were two such sides, two opposite sides, then we must point out that the R.A. represents the good, the heroic side of Chinese nation. The cowards are the worst of the Chinese nation. Sooner or later these cowards must be thrown off by the _____. We can not ~~have~~ all the heroes of the R.A. but they were innumerable. One is name _____ the man who carried the gun boxes about 40 lbs. each, all the way; now in Red Academy. Another carried the sedan chair of Mao all the way, without change. Now working for government, .copies newsprints.

Include statistics on First Army Corps here:

"Someone in the R.A." (_____ wrote this poem, epitomizing the Long March.)

- "The R.A. did not fear the difficulties of the Long March
- "They looked upon thousands of mts, & 10,000 rivers as nothing
- "The Wu Ling Range rises & towers like waves
- "The Wu Meng Range stretches like bills (small mud pellets or pies)
- "Chin Hsia Kiang's warm waves lent the rocks warmth
- "On Ta Tu Ho the Bridge spans with cold iron chains
- "More delightful were the 1,000 li of snow on Min Shan
- "After this mt. passed, all smile.

Poem written in Chinese

Maps of battles

Beginning at the front of book 14 Interview with Lin Pei-chu

Lin Pei-Chun. Comm of France. Interview, July 20, 1936.

First we must make clear two things. Our economic policy has been modified at present, due to the immediate needs of the people and the demands of the political situation. Second, our policy varies from the patterns of Soviet financial policy in the S.U. at the same time it bears no resemblance to KMT policy.

Jap invasion has made changes necessary. We are in a war situation. Will be long time. Hence our policy now based two fundamentals. First, to equip & supply Red Army. Second, to bring immediate economic relief & improvement to the people.

Direct & indirect incomes of the Sov. Gov as follows. In cap. countries most gov. revenues derived from the masses. We on contrary impose burden on the exploiting classes; landlords, big merchants, usurers, counter-revolutionary class. (A landlord is one who rents his land to tenant farmer & derives his principal income from exploitation of tenant or tenants, or from usury etc.) Those who merely hire labor not regarded as landlords.) In Shansi, nothing. e

Second item of income are taxes. In K., we call a single tax according farmers ability to pay. Poor peasants paid none; middle peasants paid moderate tax, former tenants paid none, rich peasants paid heavily. Tax varied from 1% to 5%; at most 5%. Land is equally distributed according to persons, not families. In K. in the end, taxes were abolished altogether. except land tax, in order to develop commerce. In Shansi we have so far collected no taxes at all. e

The third source of income is from voluntary sacrifice of the people. Patriotic feeling was so high that many peasants made contributions. Many gave blankets, part of harvest. etc.

Fourth item was People's Economy. In Kiangsi we had mines; tungsten & wolfram employed more than 5,000 workers. Had we ~~not~~ not been blockaded we could have exported much. Income derived also from coal mines, iron works, printing works, paper industry, a small gold mine. This doesn't include war industries. By development of People's Economy we were able to increase our income very much.

5) Indirect Income. We appealed to the masses to save & accumulate their money to help the government. Every party, government, mass organ saved money for the soviet's use. These savings largely made by economical practices; people urged to buy only Soviet products & try to balance foreign trade. 6) Confiscations 40% in Shensi. Soviets sent much money to Manchuria also to fighters in Shanghai. 6) In Kiangsi we built customs stations on our frontiers & this was a source of income.

Our financial policy is but one part of the general economic policy. In order to supply R.A. & the life of our worker & soldiers we must have other economical policies besides fiscal. We produced bumper rice crops & exported for sale; also tungsten, coal, some iron, linen(?) drugs etc. In exchange for this we imported peoples' necessities; cloth, cotton yarn, steel, machinery, medicines, salts, chemicals. Foreign trade enabled exchange of products. We did not seek a monopoly; we sought to expand our trade. Only a small part of commerce conducted by gov., majority was private trade.

Currency In KMT districts many different kinds of banknotes - foreign, native, provincial, shop, etc. In Soviet areas there exists only one kind of currency. This is the currency of the Soviet State Bank. Widely circulated among people & greatly trusted. Why? Because they have purchasing power. Because the coops provide them with necessities. So circulation of our currency very healthy.

Currency a complex problem. America had much gold, England also yet off gold reserve, adopted modified inflation. Money represents value, not reserve. Most countries now adopting unredeemable paper money. Our Soviet money is readily accepted for export trade or international payments. we must of course, deal in gold & silver exchange. In Soviet areas this is not necessary. Notes poorly circulated in white districts & border regions.

Besides paper notes we keep a reserve of gold, silver, foreign currencies, etc. This reserve is used to balance our foreign trade. Just now there is an unfavorable balance of trade. Must import more than we export, due to blockade, and difficulties of export. Hence we have to pay in gold, silver or foreign currencies, for imports. This money comes from confiscations of landlords; usurers hoardings.

In order to become self-sufficient in necessities, in order to render currency sound, we must devote our attention to developing industry. Paper, tobacco, camphor, lumber, linen, handicrafts, remained in private control but under government supervision; s.y. lent them money, Some organized own cooperatives. Because of economical crises all over China these industries were at first in a depressed state; gradually recovered. In addition we began to build state industries; paper, sugar, tobacco, tungsten etc. But most important & predominant part were private industries. Other sov. war industries; arsenals (3 in Kiangsi), printing house, mint, clothing factories.

Cooperation occupies sig. role in our people's economy. Cooperatives are operated mainly for consumers rather than producers. Peasants pay 50 each for share in cooperatives. When commodities are scarce only coop members can buy. When plentiful open to public. Distribution of commodities in Soviet districts, with development, will be greatly facilitated; Cooperatives also help in distribution, help in collection of export goods for sale to gov., in developing local industries. In Kiangsi we had a central union of cooperatives, a system very well organized.

State Export & Import Bureau; ~~Our~~ Our silver gold reserve insufficient for trade. Our export bureau collects native produced goods. In Shansi we collect fruit, animals for export. At different points along the front we have established import offices. KMT unsecceded in maintaining

street blockade. Small merchants ready to trade; smuggling easy. Imported goods given to provincial cooperatives.

As to private merchants, we help them develop commerce. We don't hinder their activity. We don't overtax them. Under KMT the taxes imposed are terrific. In Kiangsi the merchants were taxed only if their capital exceeded \$1,000 & if they had profit return. Taxed 1½% of their profit. If capital larger they were taxed more. If profit larger taxes as high as 2%. Even this light business tax is not collected here (Shansi) In Wayapao commerce developed very rapidly due to absence of taxes. Customs tariff also light; none on necessities in Shansi. Luxuries, cigarettes, toothpaste, perfume, expensive soaps.

Unification of Finance: Every dollar collected by the soviet organs or by the R.A. is handed over to the Finance Commissariat. Every dollar spent must be entered on the budget. Budget approved in advance by Finance Committee. Budget system is used by Soviet, and actually carried out, unlike KMT. In R.A. there is special committee for taking care of Financial Collections, etc. and no disbursements can be made without approval of Finance Com. Each army had a monthly budget; extra expenditures must be approved in advance.

In order to develop industry, agriculture & commerce we lend money to merchants, peasants & industrialists. Short-term & long-term loans. Rates of interest is from 2 - 4%. Half year loans pay only 2%: year loan up to 4%. Peasants (poor) and R.A. men pay no interest on loans.

This spring we made a Spring Sowing Loan to poor peasants for seeds tools, etc., for hal year and year at 3%. Formerly KMT rates very heavy. Only in North Shansi, in a few districts, we have loaned \$100,000 to the peasantry. "Not much, but formerly, under KMT, we got nothing. Now under S.G. we get land & money at no interest. Therefore we don't want to take money unless its necessary. Keep it for the Red Army." Merchants can borrow at 5% Coops pay only 4% for loans.

Organization of Finance Commissariat:

1. Bureau of Accounting
2. Bureau of Confiscations
3. Treasury

Government:

Budget Commission

Commissariat of Peoples' Economy

1. Bureau of Cooperatives
2. Foreign Trade
3. Industrial Production
4. Statistical Bureau (in Kiangsi)
5. Planning Commission " "

In every province also a Finance Comm and a Comm. of Peoples' Economy.

Red Army Food, clothing, allowances, provided by Finance Commission. Each fighter gets 2 or 3 dollars (when there is money) per month. In Kwangsi each got 4.8 dollars per month: If in white districts they confiscated food & clothing this allowance not given. Food especially good. Pork in White Army a rarity, in R.A. plentiful, due to confiscations. Also get a little money for their own use. In Soviet districts life isn't so good for soldiers as on the march; everything already been confiscated. Hence incentive for new conquests. In White Army soldiers try to remit money to families; salaries so low they cannot. In R.A. just the opposite. families send money to Red troops; their land is tilled for them at home.

Living Condition of People

Workers formerly got only \$3.00 per month in Kiangsi. With increase of wages they were getting 4.30 per month. 10 times increase. This had to be altered because in present state of Sineconomic development employer can make no profit. In Shansi we have had to modify our policy. Raised wages;

(e)